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Ilf4RODhCTION
History, generally, consists both of a series of major events--
wars, reigns, and revolutions--which, whether or not they shape it, at
least. mark major changes in its course; and a succession not of dates,
places and prominent personalities, but of general phases of socto-
cultural development, An emphasis on the first aspect in writing
history, economic or any other kind, tends to present historical change
in terms of a series of bounded periods, more or less distinct units
of time characterized by sone special significance of their own:
they represent the Triumph of Liberalism, the Dominance of Napoleon,
or the Time of the Crusades. On the other hand, the second approach,
sometimes called social or cultural history, sees historical change
as a relatively continuous social process which shows few if any sharp
breaks.* Rather, it displays a slow but patterned alteration in which,
though developmental stages may be discerned when the entire course of
the process is viewed as a whole, it is nearly always very difficult,
if not impossible, to put one's finger exactly on the point at which
things stopped being what they were and became instead something else.
This sort of change, or process, defines not so much the temporal
dimensions of history as the formal, or structural, dimensions: the
period approach distributes concrete events along a time continum
where the major distinction is earlier or later; the socio-cultural
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2approach distributes forms of organization along a time continuum
in which the major distinction is prerequisite and outcome. Time is
a crucial element in both; but in the first time is a thread along which
speeitc happenings are strung, in the second time is a medium through
which certain abstract processes move.
Four such processes are crucial in the Javanese case: the chang-
ing forms of ecological adaptation to the environment on the part of
the peasantry; the development of workable authority relationships
between the ruling and the ruled; the specific pattern of growth which
urbanization has followed; and the ideological factors, most especially
religious, in terms of which these processes have taken place and by
means of which they have been regulated. After a brief summuary of the
major periods in Javanese history, offered as a chronological frame-
work within which to place the less specifically time-tied develop-
meats, a discussion of these four processes and their relations to one
another will be presented.
Under the rubric of ecological adaptation we shall be concerned
mainly with changes in the relationships between land and labor, for
the peasant the two factors of production of most immediate importance.
We shall attempt to show that there has been a shift from an economic
contest in which labor was in short supply to one in which land is in
short supply, without labor therefore becoming, in any simple way,
superabundant. We shall try to show that adaptational patterns have,
in the past one hundred years, shoswn a tendency towards rigidification
which has now nearly reached its absolute limits.
3The problem of political authority will be viewed as one ccntoring
around the legitimization and symbolization of differences in social
status and upon that basis establishing stable forms of government.
The growth of a marked class-chasm botween peasantry and gentry and
the steady solidification of differently ordered systems of social
stratification within each of the two groups will be seen to pose a
problem of political integration which, in the pre-colonial period,
was never more than partially solved. The development of a modern
administrative bureaucracy by a conversion of the gentry into a class
of civil servants by the Dutch and the failure of sharp class ccnfliCts
to develop within the village system rnder conditions of declining
welfare and skyrocketing population brings this soequcnce up to the
present.
The analysis of urbanization will locus around the dsn on
between the inland castle towns and the north coast Iaaar te'rs
The cultural homogeneity, isolationism, and agrarian ethos of the former
will be contrasted to the heterogeneity, cosmopolitanism,and norc"n-
tilism of the latter, and the typical sorts of social relationship
associated with each will be outlined. The more modern devclopmont
of smaller towns scattered about the countryside will be seen to 7e
primarily a result of increasing comprehensiveness of colonial admini-
stration, but to be comnposed of elements from both major types of city
and of urbanizod rural elements as well. The modern oriod also it-
nesses the transCformation of the large castle and bazaar towns in-to
huge metropolitan centers, traces of their originally distirctivo
4character remaining, nevertheless, quite apparent.
The religious patterns discussed are the aboriginal "animism" of
the mass of the population; Hinduism, which appeared shortly after the
time of Christ and had its primary impact upon the gentry; and Islam,
which swept through Java in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries on
the heels of a great international trade expansion. The two "conver-
sions" will be correlated with the economic and political developments
previously described and an attempt will be made to relate the beliefs
of animism, Hinduism and Islam to types of social integration. The form
which these religious traditions have taken in recent history, where
they have persisted as variant emphases within a population nominally
ninety-five percent moslem, will be discussed as reflecting the general
theme of the paper: the necessity for seeing economic development as
part of a broader process of social, politicalyand cultural change.
I. A Chronological Outline
The history of Java, as the history of Indonesia generally, 1 may
be separated into three main, relatively isolable, sequences. The
first sequence consists of the development of Hindu-Buddhist and,
later, Moslem kingdoms out of a tribal Indonesian background as a
result of political and economic contacts between India and Indonesia
in the first centuries of the Christian era. The second concerns the
impress of European colonial rule on the islands and the increasing
encroachment upon native political power which followed upon it. And
the third, still in its initial stages, has seen the rise of nationalism
leading to a revolution against colonial rule and the establishment
of the present independent Republic.
Direct documentary knowledge of the tribal period in Java is lacking
so that, in fact, this period lies not in history but in pre-history,
From archeological and comparitive evidence we may infer that popula-
tion density was very low everywhere, that slash-and-burn shifting
cultivation of rice began quite early and remained dominant for some
time even after the introduction of irrigated crop and fallow methods,
and that root and fruit crops played a greater role in the economy
than they do now, but any sort of dated and detailed chronology is im-
possible. By the time the first Indians arrived--the earliest temple
inscription is about 400 AD--regionally localized states of some mini-
mum degree of development must almost certainly have existed at various
points in Java, scattered chiefdoms which formed the growing points
for later large scale political developments.
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6Whether the carriers of Hindu culture2 to Indonesia were merchants
or priests is still under discussion, but the first hinduized "states,"
one Shivaite (the first Mataram, usually dated around 730 AD) and one
Mahayana Buddhist (Shailendra, ca. 780-870) are found not along the
coast but inland in Central Java near where Jogjakarta lies today.
These earlier kingdoms--if they were single kingdoms--which left behind
them carved stone temples of an almost purely Indian style , were suc-
ceeded in time by the development in eastern Java of states whose fused
Shivaite and Buddhist art styles show a less purely Indian, more in-
digenous, form, This development, which included the kingdoms of
Kadiri (1050-1220) and Singhasari (1220-1300), came to its climax in
Madjapahit (1294-1478), a kingdom which, at the height of its power,
commanded respect and exacted tribute from all of Indonesia.
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But, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, there occured a
sudden expan3ion of international trade through the whole of Asia,
stimulated, ultimately, by the davming age of exploration in Spain,
Portugal, Holland,and England, which shook the economic, politicalg and
religious foundations of the hinduized states. From the northern tip
of Sumatra at Acheh, the western-most point of the Indonesian archi-
pelago, a great sea-street runs down through the narrow straits of
Malacca, the tranquil Java sea, the sea of Flores and the Banda sea
to the famous spice islands, the Moluccas, to the east. Along this
narrow ocean corridor, bounded on the northern side by the Malay pea-
insula Borneo and the Celebes and on the south by Sumatra, Javaand
the Lesser Suhdas, a great polyglot horde of traders, pirates, and
7political adventurers sailed in search of profit and diversion and,
to serve them in both respects, a series of ports sprang up on both
sides of the passage: Bandjermasin in Borneo, Macassar in the Celebes,
Ache In Sumatra, Bantam, Djapara, Tuban, Grisik and Surabaja in Java
became busy semi-independent commercial centers, the most important
of them being the south Malaya city-kingdom of Malacca, the entrepot,
emporium and toll house for the entire expansion.4
The adjapahit aristocracy struggled to keep this mercantile flour
escence within their administrative grasp, to maintain their hold over
the various coastal bazaars and so add trade profits to agricultural
surpluses as the eccnomic basis of their political domination. But,
although branches of the hindu aristocracy thrust themselves into the
midst of the comercial hubub of these market towns, Madjapahit was
unable to move away from a very personalized form of military despotism
to a more stable type of civil administration; and so the spectacular
but essentially flimsy East Javanese kingdom collapsed, setting the
stage for Java's second religious revolution. This was the coming of
Islam. In 1414 Malacca converted and nhamad's creed began to ispradf!
eastward along the coasts of Sumatra and Borneo. Soon the traders n
the north coast Javanese ports were predominantly Moslem and, fol n
them, the local aristocracies began to convert too, rejecting bot 7- :-
political and religious ascendancy of Madjapahit. By 1450 there was
a north-coast Moslem kingdom in Java at Demak and by the end of the
sixteenth century Hinduism, as an official state religion, had nr
disappeared from Java.
8Demak, Java's first important Moslem kingdom, struggled to con-
trol the inland rice bowls in order to strengthen its political posi-
tion along the coast, but in 1582 its most important interior province,
again called Mataram and, as the first Mataram, centered in the Surakarta
rice basin of Central Java, revolted and turned the greater part of
the Javanese economy and society inward once more, toward an agricul-
tural and away from a trading orientation. But by now the Europeans
had begul to arrive in force: the Portuguese captured Malacca in 1511
and in 1619 Jan Pieterszoon Coen, Holland's great empire builder,
founded Batavia (now Djakarta) on the north coast near the Western
tip of the island, initiating the Colonial Period. The rest of the
history of the pre-colonial states is a dreary tale of steady contraction
under Dutch encroachment until, in 1955, the mortally weakened Mataram
is divided into two tiny make-believe states, Surakarta and Jogjakhdti,
which persist as powerless, static caretakers of the old court religious
and aesthetic .traditions until they are absorbed, at the close of the
Revolution, into the new Republik Indonesia.5
The Colonial Period consists, from the economic and political
point of view, of a series of attempts on the part of the Dutch to
realize a commercial profit on Java, to make of the island a stable
source of export crops for which attractive international markets
existed. 6 The Netherlands was never able, particularly after the most
industrially developed part of the country, Belgium, broke away in
1830, to develop a manufacture export economy comparable to that of
Britain, and so the interest of the Dutch in "the Indies" remained
9predeiatnatly mercantalist to the end. The stimulation in Java of
extensive markets for industrial goods, it was feared, would lead
only to Increased British (or, later, Japanese) influence, and so
the pemt ation of rational Western forms of economic organization,
insofar as it took place at all, was almost wholly on the side of pro-
duction, and then only in the agricultural sector .7 Such an extreme
constriction of the range of contact between the Dutch and Javanese
economies, or, more properly, between the Indonesian and world econo-
mies, could only be maintained by a firm welding, on the Dutch side,
of the political and the economic, and a continuing isolation, in the
Javanese side, from the direct exporience of the play of international
economic forces. Java 's products were allowed to come into the, world
economy, but not Java's people.
The outcome was what has been called a dual, sometimes, taking the
Chinese control of distributive trade and small-scale money lending
into account, a plural economy .E In the export sector, there was
administrative capitalism: a system in which the suppliers of cap-
ital, the Dutch, regulated domestic prices and wages, controlled out-
put and dictated the process of production. In the subsistence crop
sector there was family-unit agriculture, a little home industry, and
some petty domestic trade. As the first expanded, stimulated by rising
commodity prices, the second contracted; land was taken out of rice
and corn and put into tobacco, indigo, sugar or coffee. As the first
contracted, responding to collapsing markets, the second expanded, and
the peasant attemptd to make up a lost money incone, which was not
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so great in any case, by increased production of self-consumed food.
With perfect flexibility such a systewould seem rather less disor-
gamising to the traditional native economy than the more direct methods
of other colonial governments; but the very monopolistic nature of eco-
nomic organization on the dynamic European side made a certain sticki-
ness inevitable. Not only did a booming export market tend to compress
the subsistence sector beyond realistic limits, but the ability of
Dutch economic leadership to respond speedily to changing market con-
ditions was constrained by the weight of financial conservatism. The
tendency was to maintain inadequate policies to the point at which
insolvency (aided, usually, by administrative corruption) set it, at
which point the export sector would collapse almost entirely, leaving
the (steadily increasing) native population to pick up the pieces as
best it could.9
Dutch colonial history, consequently, was marked by a series of
politico-economic devices--the most important of which were the East
India Company, the Culture System, and the Corporate Plantation System--
by means of which the European side of the dual economy was to be more
efficiently organized toward the production and marketing of export
crops, and the native side was to be better protected against the dia-
ruptive effects of this large scale commercial agriculture. But, as
each device entailed a deeper penetration of native life by Western
enterprise than the one it replaced, it actually made it more, rather
than less, difficult to isolate native life from the economic forces
with which such enterprise deals.
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The first of these devices, the East India Company, was founded
in 1602 as a state-supported far-eastern trade monopoly with a large
degree autoomy--" a state within a state"--in order to counter
the active competition of the other European powers, Portugal,, pain)
and England, trading in the archipelago. At first, the Company was
interested only in the spice trade and in acquiring, also through
trade, whatever other export products might be carried to Europe (or
other parts of Asia) at a profit., Its initial impact in Java was,
therefore, almost wholly confined to the north coast ports. But trade
follows the flag, and the Company soon became interested in gaining
political control over the sources of supply of the goods upon which
its profits depended. By supporting, militarily and economically,
one or another candidate in the persistent succession struggles which
plagued the conspiracy-ridden harbor kingdoms, the Company gradually
extended its power to administer the north coast economy in its own
interests. First, special price trading monopolies and freedom from
trade taxes, then delivery contracts of goods specified as to type,
price and quantity, then direct rights to tax returns upon which the
native kingdoms rested (i.e., to tribute): step by step the Company
reduced the Sultans and their staffs to the position of native admini-
strators in Company service, useful mainly for their traditional re-
ligious and political hold on the common people.
From the coast, the Company moved inland, repeating the process
and destroying the power of Mataram, the last important native state,
Freed of checks either from the Dutch Government, which had very little
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knowledge of its inner workings, or from indigenous political powers,
the Company soon became both uneconomically exploitative and spectacu-
larly corrupt. Following its downfall (it was dissolved in 1799, after
several decades in receivership, by the newly established Napoleonic
government of Holland), there was a brief five year period of British
rule, Britain occupying the islands as part of her war against Napoleon,
under Thomas Stamford Raffles. Raffles, a visionary free trade liberal,
attempted to introduce elected village governments, individual land
tenures and money land taxes in the hope of stimulating domestic eco-
noic growth and establishing marlketa for British exports. But this
interlude soon was but a memory, for the Dutch, restored to power,
introduced, in 1830, their second major program to turn Java into the
world's most piofitable plantationAs the Culture System.
In essence, the Culture System was but a more effective extension
of the econ6mic policy of the Company, a deeper penetration of the
Dutch administration into the details of native economic life. Now
the Government was not only to determine policy decisions--Ile., pro-
duction controls and price levels--while leaving their realization to
the native royalty and its administrative staff, but was to become
directly concerned with planning the actual business of cultivation.,
The peasant was obligated, in lieu of land tax, either 'to plant cer-
tain export crops on his land (in theory 1/5; in practice, as much as
he could bear) as dictated by the Government or, 'less commonly, to work
on Government plantations for a similar percentage of his time. Much
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of Java thus became one large Government agricultural concern manned
by forced labor .10
At first this was an extremely profitable venture, but in time
it followed the Company through the dreary process of corruption
exploitation and insolvency, and it was abandoned in 1870, following
an outburst of popular iridignation in Holland as a result of lurid
expos~s of its seamier side. The Culture System, although it lasted
by forty years, 1 1 had a profound effect on Java. It led to the
strengthening and rationalization of the native bureaucracy, through
whom the program was largely administered. It introduced the peasant
to new export crops and more effective forms of intensive agriculture.
It stimulated population growth tremendously, because a labor tax on
land means the higher the labor to land ratio, the less the per capita
tax.12 And it also mnaged to achieve the seemingly impossible task
of making land-ownership an unwanted burden in a peasant society, thus
reversing the trend toward individual tenures, stimulated by Raffles,
back toward collective forms of ownership. But most important, it
stereotyped the traditional Javanese methods of land use and prevented
the effects of Western contact from leading to an agricultural revo-
lution.
With the passing of the Culture System there came to the Indies
what is usually known as the Liberal Period. It was, however, liberal
only in a rather academic sense. It was a shift, on the side of the
Dutch domestic economy, mostly as a result of the competitive need
for more scientific types of planting and crop care than could be
14
accomplished under the Culture System method, from the use of the
organs of Government for the production of export products to the use
of private firms to the same end On the side of the Indies, the change
was rather less apparent, for not only the differences between the
Government and the large private corporations which soon grew up only
minor--so from the point of view of the peasant he was still faced with
a European monolithic concern--but there was little serious attempt
to extend the economic principles of liberalism to the native sphere,
nor where the large plantation-corporations more than marginally in-
terested in stimulating native demand for Dutch goods.
But some of the moral principles of enlightened liberalism were
extended to the native realm, partly as a result of the humanitarian
reaction to the excesses of the Culture System, partly because the
isolation of native life from forces disruptive of it was becoming
progressively more difficult and so demanded more complex techniques:
keeping the native nativer began to become a full-time job. Laws
preventing alienation of native lands, labor protection and fair rent
ordinances, anti-usury laws, improved medical care and, to a lesser
extent, increased concern for native education, all appeared at this
time. Liberalism, and the large plantation-corporation period which
grew out of it, was thus in actuality a new form of mercantalism, an
attempt to perpetuate the dual economy; the Government attempting,
with varying degrees of succes' to act as a kind of uwpire rtrda,
the corporations and protecting the peasants. It was, in. sum, but
a third major device to make of the Indies a profitable source of exports
It was, too, the most direct, the most deeply penetrating, of the
devices; for now the average Javanese came into increased contact with
the world of Dutch capital. Javanese labor was transported, more or
less voluntarily (though Government-enforced penal sanctions often
guaranteed the worker's part of the bargain for the employer), to
Sumatran tobacco plantations, oil refineries, and tin mines. 1 3  Large
sugar concerns began to rent land from the peasants by means of a
system, similar to that of the Culture System, in which the peasant
gave for a money rent payment one-third of his wet-rice land (usually
a different third each year) to the plantation to plant sugar on and
grew what he wished on the remainder. Coffee, rubber, tapiocaand
other plantations were set up on previously uncultivated lands rented
from the Government, drawing its largely seasonal labor force from the
villages, and many Javanese began to get non-agricultural jobs--chauf-
feurs, servants, tailors--to serve the increased flow of Netherlanders
come to the Indies to make private fortunes,14
But, again, though the initial .phases were auspicious, the picture
of increasing profits was again marred, first by turn-of-the-century
revelations of the horrors of plantation life in Sumatra, and then,
in 1929, by the great depression which more or less destroyed the
international commodity markets upon which the new prosperity was de-
pendent. But, even more important, the progressively intensive pene-
tration of the West, first the Company, then the Culture Systemand then
the Plantation Period,-began to work on the native body politic leading
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to a re-amkening of indigenous political leadership and ultimately,
the structure of Colonial Government cru3hed by the Japanese occupa-
tin of t eEast Indies in the second world war, to the disappeai'ance
of the Dutch, in the political sense, from the scene altogether.
The rise of nationalism was a result of the ultimate failure ot
the Dutch policy of isolating native society from international ecow
nomic and political currents 15 Despite the theories of indirect
rule to which they were attached, the Dutch did not so much protect
Javanese society against disruption from Western introduced changes
as they prevented it from adapting freely to such changes. During
the Colonial Period, the position of the aristocracy was stabilized
and transformed into a rational civil bureaucracy, but the higher
level offices, and with them all policy decisions, were kept in Euro-
pean hands. The Chinese middleman was strengthened and Javanese trade,
even domestic trade, stunted. Javanese agriculture became increas-
ingly intensive and diversified, its productivity increased through
more efficient farming practices and improved irrigation; but, as the
native population was unable to participate in the more extensive forms
of agriculture, this increasing efficiency was at the same time an
increasing inflexibility in the forms of adaptation. Native population
was stimulated so that a sparsely settled island turned into one of the
most densely crowded areas of the world, a fact which led, among other
things, to increased stability of settlement, fractionization of land-
holdings and-probably--to a declining level of welfare. But perhaps
the most important result, from the economic point of view, was the
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weakening of the Javanese sense for economic rationality:
Moreover, Dutch rule damaged not only the social
structure but the mental outlook of the people.
When. reforms were agitated after the fall of the
Company it was often alleged that the Javan had
no wish to better himself and, if paid more, would
only work less. Yet on the first introduction of
coffee, the crop spread rapidly so long as culti-
vation was remunerative. But the Company found it
more profitable to resort to forced labor, compulsory
cultivation and arbitrary destruction that to depend
for produce on the law of supply and demand; the
bitter experience of two hundred years dulled the
economic sense of the people and, after living for
two centuries in a land where the laws of economics
did not run, it is not strange that they ceased
to recognize them. Thus the economic life of the
people was not merely stunted by the suppression
of all economic activities but agriculture, it was
also vitiated by the nullification of economic laws.1 6
The increasing pressures of Western penetration led, then, ul-
timately to violent reaction on the part of the native population.
After about thirty years of growing nationalist agitation--in the
form of religious groups, trade unions, political parties and anti-
foreign movements--a declaration of independence from Dutch rule was
proclaimed on August 17, 1945 by Ir. Sukarno and Muhammad Hatta, now
President and Vice President of the Republic. There followed a series
of armed clashes between British and Dutch troops and the Republicans,
leading, in 1950, to a withdrawal of the Dutch from the archipelago
and a transfer of sovereignty to the native Government. Economic
policies in the post-colonial era have not developed far enough to
be certain what form they will finally take, but the leaders of the
new Indonesia are publicly committed to a turning away from the near-
exclusive export orientation to a more balanced type of economy and
to rapid economic growth, evidently in the form of sharply increased
18
1aLDustrial1ation. Internai security problems, serious balance Of
payments difficulties, lack of skilled technicians for both economic
and political postsyand the inherited rigidities of the still quite
pluralistic" economy have, however, prevented any great amount of
prog esS toward these goals
II. Patterns of Ecological Adaptation
The two factors of production which are--and always have been--
of primary importance within the peasant economy are land and labor.
In the pre-modern stages of Javanese history--up until the time of the
Culture System--labor was in short supply, and evidently progreseively
so, for each new form of land-uset introduced into the island--tropical
forest root crop gardening, shifting cereal agriculture, terraced wet-
rice growing--demanded a more intensive application of labor, more man-
hours of work per given unit of land. Since the Culture System and the
population explosion which followed it, land has been increasingly in
short supply, in the sense that increasing output by bringing new units
into cultivation has become nearly impossible. Paradoxically, however,
labor h&, not therefore become simply superabundant within the village
context. It remains, to a degree at least, in short supply, in the sense
that, additional land being unavailable, capital being relatively primi-
tive and serious organizational innovation being largely impossible
within the given, traditionally sanctified, productive pattern, an in-
crease in labor intensity is almost the sole means of increasing out-
put and any noticeable reduction of labor input is likely to have de-
pressing effects on production
This fact implies at least a partial disappointment for those theo-
rists who envisage a solution of Java's economic problems through a
19
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simple transfer of hordes of "underemployed" workers from agriculture
to industry without reducing agricultural output. It points to
the existence of a socially stereotyped productive process in which
the geutamir undersupplied factors are capital and organization;
cue in which a steady process of labor intensification, a process
slowed but not halted by an increasing shortage of land, has led
to a situation where the structural rigidity in the demand for this
factor has become very great. So great, in fact, that, despite
the obvious existence of "structural underemployment" (a term which
merely implies that the analyst can conceive of an entirely different,
economically-but not necessarily sociologically--feasible productive
process which could produce the same output with less labor), the
existence of "concealed unemployment," in the much broader sense
of there being workers who, without any change in the pattern of
agricultural exploitation, can be wholly transferred to non-agri-
cultural occupations with little or no effect on agricultural out-
put, is much less widespread that is usually supposed. Such con-
cealed unemployment does exist, most especially in the towns,
where the population overflow from the countryside has tended to
settle in small pools of semi-idle urban poor. But it is easily
overestimated because the labor-absorbing capacity, and, a
labor-demanding capacity, of Javanese agriculture and, to a lesser
extent, of the Javanese urban occupational system, tends to be
underestimated. The problem is not simply one of quantitative
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factor inputs, a shortage of one implying a surplus of the other
irrespective of cultural, psychological, and technological context,
but of their qualitative relations as determined by such a context.
To understand Javanese agriculture one should imagine a long
line of workmen transporting sacks of potatoes from farm to market
by passing them along a line, each worker covering, say, one-quarter
mile. No one is doing very much work and no one is very specialized,
but if someone is dropped out of the line, the number of sacks
passed per hour goes down (assuming no reorganization of the work
process, no addition of capital and ignoring possible saving from
the elimination of a transfer point), unless the workers either
walk faster, carry more sacks per trip or work longer hours. If we
assume, further, that work patterns are also traditionalised so
that this will not occur, then an output drop is inevitable. If,
however, another workman is added (to the original line), it becomes
possible to increase output, though there is a small efficiency
loss due to the addition of another transfer point.
If, however, the time comes when potato production at the
supply end of the line--the "land element" in this model--has reached
its maximum output, addition of new workers to our transport line
will reduce output per worker, tending to push wages, considered
as a fixed per cent of output, down toward subsistence. In such
a case, total output per hours-now at a maximum--is maintained
but the addition of a new worker means all workers work less and
assumes therefore that although workers will not be willing to
22
walk faster or carry more sacks or work longer hours they will be
willing to walk slower or work shorter hours or carry less sacks.
This assumption is easily enough made, based on the oain notion
In well-integrated societies that any man in the community has
& natural right to work. and a place must be made for him, even
if it means declining welfare for others. If, further, we assume
that this whole process occurs slowly over an extended period of
time--moving from a situation where additional labor means additional
output and rising welfare to one where it means constant output
but decreasing individual returns--then we can see how each new
labor pattern will slowly crystallize into being the "normal,"
culturally expected one. Or, rather, that ,in a situation of increasing
labor supply and constant output workers will characteristically
be willing to restrict their own efforts to let a new mea into the
line, but characteristically unwilling (i.e., unable) to expand
a kind of downward ratchet effect in which a productive process
becomes addicted to labor: the more it uses the more it needs.
This peculiar Alice-in-Wonderland world, where people will
work less hard, but not more; where they will allow other workers
to reduce their own real income through a progressively disfunctiomal
form of feather-bedding; and where output stays the same but labor
patterns grow steadily more complex, may seem a simply irrational
fancy, but it is in fact a model of the type of situation toward
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which the Javanese economy has moved in its process of development
As a model, it is a polar type,1 7 and the Javanese situation is still
far from being this rigidified. But the direction is apparent
and can be demonstrated, There has been a succession of modes of
land use each growing out of its predecessor and each demanding
more labor for its effective application, a succession which did
not stop as land grew scarce but continued, stimulated by an increasing
population and constrained by a traditionalized inability to alter
radically the basic form of ecological adaptation. Put another
way, there has been steady progress toward higher "natural" nutri-
tional densities, toward a narrowing of the gap between underpopu-
lation and overpopulation.
The earliest form of land use in Java was one still practiced
in many areas of Melanesia, Central and South America, and Africa--
tropical rain forest cultivation of starchy root and fruit crops. 1 8
These root and fruit crops--yam, taro,'banana, breadfruit--most of
which seem to have developed on the Asian mainland, were probably
grown with only a minimal amount of clearing, They were supple-
mented at an early date by millet and, probably by dry rice; but
despite the advantages of easier storage and greater food value
associated with cereals, the new arrivals must have had little effect
on the Javanese economy: in the absence of iron tools, the cultivation
of cereals, whatever their botanical superiority, has little advantage
over root crop cultivation. This earliest form of land use was,
thus, a kind of jungle gardening, a small scale root and cereal
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horticulture in which scattered and only moderately cleared family
sized plots, often deep in the sunless forest, were sporadically
cultivated, much as among certain contemporary tribes in the South
American Amazon
The introduction of iron for hoes and axes did not so much
alter the form of the neolithic regime as intensify it. From the
pattern of small clusters of "freely migrating" root and primitive
cereal growers scattered rather randomly throughout the tropical
rain forests, emerged a pattern of wide-spread shifting agricultur-
alists moving within more rigorous migratory cycles. Larger clearings
were made, family plots being contiguous with one another rather
than isolated; a more thorough destruction of the forest cover
took place; and grains, which drain the soils of their nutrients
more rapidly than the starchy roots, came to dominate the latter.
As a result, this form of land use interfered more seriously with
the natural balance between growth and decay in the tropical forest
areas--where soils are poor in any case--and exposed the land to
the serious leaching effects of the warm equatorial rains.
In favorable cases, the impact of slash-and-burn techniques
upon the ecological equilibrium of the tropical environment is
minimized by the shifting of fields every year or two, returning
to used fields only after a space of from six to twenty years;.
and in such cases the pattern is ust-ally adaptive. It may turn
maladaptive, however, in two ways' by an increase in population
which demands old plots be recultivated too soon; or by an extension
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into a too arid environment where the more deoiduous forests have
a =uch slower recovery time and where clearing fires are likely to
get aug of hand and burn off great stands of timber. In either
case, the result is the same. There occurs an evolution through
progressively more open forests composed of light-loving, fire-
resistant trees ending, if the process is not checked, in the
replacement of the cover altogether by the notorious a -a
savannah grass which has turned so much of Southeast Asia into a
green desert 1
Iron-age slash-end-burn, which is still the dominant mode of
land use in almost all cultivable areas of Southeast Asia where
wet rice agriculture is impractical due to low temperatures, very
low soil fertility and/or serious irrigation problems, thus tends
on the one hand to demand a greater input of labor, because clearing,
planting, weeding, and harvesting are now carried out rather more
seriously and systematically, and on the other hand to limit sharply
both the maximum density of the population and the possibilities
of extending cultivation into less tropical environments. Mature
shifting cultivation regimes, ones in which an adaptive ecological
balance has been found, tend to have narrow margins between under-
and over-population
In most environments, then, slash-and-burn tends to support
just about as many workers as it needs , and needs just about as
many as it supports; it takes a good quantity of labor to practice
the regime very economically at all, but if you get mauch more than
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the minimum necessary, the enviroment may be rather quickly over-
driven, In such a situation, a high development of labor-exchange
and cooperative work patterns tends naturally to occur, because
what labor there is must be manipulated with maximum flexibility
and applied with maximum efficiency within the ecological unit.
And, indeed, most modern slash-and-burn cultivators today show a
well-integrated complex of such cooperative and exchange work
patterns, as well as a marked tendency to demand that everyone--
chiefs, priests, women and children-get out and work in the fields .20
With the introduction of terraced wet-rice cultivation--again
from mainland Asia--the constricting social and economic logic of
slash-and-burn was escaped, for this mode of land use, though it
demanded as high or higher minimum labor inputs, had an intrinsic
capacity to absorb increases in such inputs, the absolute limits
of which seem not to have been reached even today, except perhaps
in Japan'. This was true because wet-rice terracing involved a form
of cultivation in which the given environment was not merely accepted
and exploited, merely adapted to, but one in which the environment
was rather radically made over, a new ecological context created
instead of merely a new adjustment to an old context. And the
working out of the implications of this ^o i,
man-environment relations took place only slowly over the course
of centuries as the Javanese found more and more ways to increase
output by a more careful attention to the details of cultivation.
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then toward the sea as the necessary skills were built up; although
the deltas themselves seem to have been uncontrollable until the,
Europeans introduced concrete dams, metal storage tanksand mechanical
water gates late in the nineteenth century. The process was not one,
merely, of progressive elaboration of irrigation methods, but other
technical and social factors played a part in this whole develop-
ment: the introduction of the ox and ox-drawn plough, the perfection
of transplanting techniques, the development of various strains of
rice for special ecological situations, and so forth.
The whole process may be seen as one in which a revised re-
lationship between man and his environment is first sketched in
rather broad and general strokes in the highlands, where only a
few of the more obvious possibilities inherent in the new relation-
ship are realized, and then a progressive filling in of details,
as the pattern moves dowe into the lowlands. There occurs a series
of technological innovations (with which we may include such "social"
innovations as more elaborate exchange work systems corvee patterns;
and forms of tenancy), which take place within the given mode of
land use, and each of which acts to increase the number of man-
hours needed to work a given unit of land, so that the irrigated
rice pattern is becoming more intensive and eztemive at the same
time. These innovations--when seen in broadly social term-are
then not labor-saving but labor absorbing. Though per-capita
output steadily increases-qt-rice cultivation is among the world's
most productive forms of agriculture--the demand for labor increases
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and each new field, in a theoretical sense, demands a greater addi-
tion to the labor force than the previous one to maintain it in
efficient operation.
In time, extensive exploitation became more and more difficult
as the best land came under cultivation and so long as intensific-
ation was able to continue there occured a kind of ecological in-
volution in which fields became more and more carefully worked in
a manner almost semi-horticultural. But, soon, intensification,
given native resources and technology, began to near its limits too.
At this point--one at which land runs out and per capita income
begins to fall due to a fall in the marginal productivity of labor--
one would perhaps expect either another revolution in the forms of
land use (which would imply a revolution in social outlook as well)
or a stabilization of population growth. But what occured was,
rather, a rigid stereotyping of the traditional pattern and a great
growth in population. This curious and seemingly maladaptive oci
curence we can--at least in part--attribute to the impact of the
West upon Javanese economic life.
By the time of the introduction of the Culture System in
1830, the pattern of Javanese agriculture in its modern for was,
for all intents and purposes, set. Those areas where it ms techni-
cally feasable (with native techniques) had been brought under
wet-rice, called saw" in Java. The old root, fruit, and dry
cereal horticultural pattern persisted in the form of house
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gardens--called pqEhaaga--but , except for a few areas in the
western and of the island, iron-age slash-and-burn (-had
disappeared.25 In unirrigable areas, too dry for slash-end-burn
but more fertile than tropical forest areas, a merging of
and sawah techniques brought into existence a crop and fallow
system--often in terraces to preserve top soil--in which cereals
and roots were planted in the wet season and the land unplanted in
the dry, a mode of land use called tegal. When the Dutch came they
provided a whole bundle of very advanced techniques from their own
intensive farming background--irrigation works, new crops, improved
tools; they actively encouraged the use of then to further involute
the traditional ecological pattern; they "protected" the Javanese
fron Western social and economic ideas; and they introduced the
plantation pattern of extensive, capital intensive exploitation of
"waste" land (i.e, land inaccessible to indigenous techniques)
for an international market, which pattern they largely reserved to
themselves.
The result was that a productive process--already one involving
rather higher population densities, particularly in the great river
areas, than we are used to in the wheat-centered West--due either
for stabilization, or, if new technical elements had come in a
less overwhelming form as they had in the past, for revision, was
given a new lease on life and, from the point of view of welfare,
seriously overdriven. Better irrigation increased the proportion of
sawah to tegal while plantation agriculture pre-empted lands into
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which the tegal pattern might haVe spread New crops diversified
agriculture but did not change its form, for they were adapted to
the intensive sawah type of exploitation, as though the Western
grains and legumes were being poured into a rice mold. Centralized
irrigation systems stereotyped the nuclear village settlement pat-
tern and fixed the residential to cultivated field ration irrevocably.
Population, stimulated by a reappearance of rising marginal returns
for labor (due both to the new techniques and to artificial reasons,
such as the labor tax on land of the Culture System period), ex-
Paaded, leading to a fragmentation of land holdings and terrace
units, disappearance of any unworked land as people pushed into
even very marginal areas that were left open to them, and an over-
crowding of villages to create rural living conditions Jay has
characterized as almost suburban in nature: great masses of people
living in one territorial unit, most of whom have but sporadic
and superficial relations with anyone outside their immediate
neighborhood 26
All this involved a further intensification of agriculture
from which, once accomplished, there was no retreat Sawab terraces
were pushed up the sides of mountains, where their narrowed form
meant a return to the ploughless cultivation of the earliest stages,
though in an infinitely more painstaking horticultural pattern.
Land fragmentation had a similar effect, because as the edge of the
terrace must always be worked with a hoe, the smaller the terrace
the less advantageous the use of the plough (mechanization in such
'A
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a context is, of course, even less likely t preve ecoomtc; at
least with -present Western technology). Travel between scattered
plots also means a greater drain on labor, as do more complex
irrigation sehenes where temporary spillways, mud-and-sticks water
gates and feeder canals are always being constructed, repaired or
removed,
Double cropping has become almost universal. Sawabs are planted
in the dry season with corn, legumes, spices, and the like--many
of them Dutch introduced--the crops often carefully interlocked in
time, -so that a new one is planted betweek the stalks of an old one
not quite ready for harvest; or a seed bed is being prepared while
the old crop is being harvested (rice needs are usually pre-germinated
in home nurseries to save time in the seed beds). Even the terrace
walls are planted and pekarangan house gardening has become miracu-
lously intensified too, there often being three layers of crops
growing at once: the high fruit trees, the medium bean plants, and
the underground roots. The more fertile tegals are cultivated
all year round, rather than in a crop and fallow pattern, often
leading to increased erosion. Ever more careful weeding, stricter
planting methods and less wasteful harvesting all have played a
part in the process. If the earliest wet-rice stage was a broad
outline sketch, and the time of the Hindu and Moslem states (and
of the Company, when the Dutch impact was still relatively light)
saw a filling in of solid detail, this last period, beginning with
the Culture System, is marked by an over-ornamentation, a roccoco
33
elaboration of agricultural detail which threatens to overwhelm
the entire structure .27
At first, the increased returns from intensification more or
less offset the rising population, but shortly, perhaps by the
beginning of this century, the Second limit on the marginal efficiency
of labor was reached (though population continued to increase),
leading to a situation of near-absolute, rather than merely relative,
decline in welfare, the last stage in our sack-passing model.
Wet-rice cultivation, after centuries in which, although it demanded
high and increasing labor inputs, it had produced surpluses above
the subsistence needs of its workers-surpluses which could be ap-
plied to supporting a non-cultivating elite--now was approaching
the pinched-in situation characteristic of slash-and-burn from
which it had originally offered an escape; one in which the minimum
aumber of people necessary to work a field was beginning to approach
the maximum number who could live off of it
By now the situation has sharply altered from the early stages,
for land is now in marked short supply,. And the labor exchange
patterns, originally evolved in response to a need to move workers
around flexibly enough to maintain output, now tend to turn more and
more toward tenancy patterns; patterns defining traditional rights
not merely in terms of control over labor but of access to land,
As I have said, the growing shortage of land and the increasing
population has not led to a simple quantitative super-abundance
of labor in relation to the technical agricultural process (though,
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in this century, such a simple quantitative super-abundance a
begun to appear) even in over-crowded Java one still encounters
situations where labor shortages--due to geographical, seasonal or
social rigidities in labor mobility play an important role
Thus, these complex labor patterns are now at once important both
in mobilizing labor and in distributing land rights: the crucial
economic problem for the peasant is still to get labor and land
together in the correct amounts, only now it is not only labor
which proves "scarce" (to call the scarcity "artificial" merely
begs the question) and somewhat difficult to manipulate, but land
as well. Money tends to get absorbed into the same structure,
being but a new technique for adjusting land and labor to one another,
through such mechanisms as land-renting, wage-work and so forth.
But, in the absence of a genuinely open and fully rational market
in either land or labor, its liberating effect is sharply limited
and it provides but a slight--though highly valued--element of
29flexibility within a very rigid and stereotyped productive process.
This stereotyping is not merely teOcnological, for the ecological
involution has been matched by an involution in the rural value system:
the adaptation of the Javanese peasantry to their envirnment ntat
not be seen as a merely technical matter, but as a productive
process organised in terms of cultural values. The evolving patterns
of land-labor manipulation are not only modes of adaptation, but
statements of the "correct" way in which production should be organ-
ized and its returns distributed;30 and these "oughts" have operated
so as to keep both labor and land inputs and agricultural output
fractionated, to keep them from becoming very concentrated in any
one group, class or individual. By continuing and re-emphasising
traditional values stressing the right to work, historically defined
"fair shares" for labor and a deep-going reluctance to sell land to
outsiders-values which must date from as far back as the slash-and-burn
days--the peasant has made certain that no effective labor saving
innovations would get a foothold in his crowded social economy.31
In the last four or five decades, somewhat desperate tendencies
toward breaking out of this socio-economic strait-jacket have become
more apparent, particularly in the more monetized areas. At the
top of the village ladder there has been some attempt to consolidate
holdings, to employ wage labor more flexibly and less tradition-
alistically, and to resist demends either for one's own labor or
for granting access to one 's land to others. At the bottom, there
has been a greater willingness, even eagerness among the really
destitute, to accept wage work, some attempt to make a living in
non-agricultural endeavors, and a good deal of urban migration in
search of work-though the towns have rather little to offer in this
respect. In such a context , money comes to be seen as the promise
of economic flexibility by the more prescient; but, as I have
indicated, its ability to bring about such flexibility i sharply
limited by the narrow range of rational markets in all the factors
of production. In general, the picture still seems to be one of
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a rural economy whose capacity to carry its population still has
not reached its absolute limits (even though marginal labor product-
ivity must be almost zero3 2 ),- which not only supports but demands
great inputs of labor, and which is prevented from changing not
only by its earlier agricultural investments but by the deeply
engrained value system of its members.
It would be incorrect, finally, to attribute this disfunctional
rigidity, this super-saturation of the socio-ecological pattern,
simply to the evils of colonialism--China and Japan should warn
us against that. The problem is actually one of intensive contact
between a technically quite "advanced" economy and a technically
"bacward" one ; and, more than that, of the particular form that
contact has taken. Circumstances alter cases, even within Southeast
Asia: witness the large estates and indiginous baronial landlord
class of the Philippines; the nearly even bi-racial split in Malaya
between simple Malay subsistence farmers and fisherman and commercially
sophisticated Chinese businessman and plantation workers; or the
small-scale Burmese commercial rice grower in the grips (at least
until recently) of Indian moneylenders--none of which have exact
parallels in the Javanese case, the difference being at least
partially traceable to differences in contact experiences.33
The only result which seems inevitable--though, hopefully, temporary--
in such sharp contact situations is serious ecological maladaption
and social strain; the peculiar pattern which develops varies.
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But the Javanese outcome does indicate that a rice-based
economy, which implies high "natural" population densities, to
which industrialism comes as a pattern borrowed from another civi-
lization rather than as an indigenously developed innovation, may
need to adopt a program of agricultural reform quite different
than those which proved necessary prior to successful industrialization
in Englan4 Germany, and(though the outcome is perhaps still not
wholly clear) Russia; a hypothesis which finds some support in the
Javanese experience 34
III. Patterns of Authority
The developmental history of authority relationships in Java
reflects the developmental history of ecological adaptation just traced.
The persistent theme in the earlier periods, prior to the final establish-
ment of Dutch sovereignty throughout the island, is a struggle for con-
trol over labor, not over land. But, in the Colonial Period, there is
a steady shift toward an increasing importance of land rights (which
are still labor rights as well) in authority relations, to the point
where one recent observer can note that "land rights are the major form
of currency in unequal social relations "35 The transition is marked
by an increasingly sedentary village pattern, an increasingly bureaucra-
tized governmental structure and a shift from a personalistic form of
political integration, based on magical ties between leader and follower
(as well as on military terror), to a more impersonal one, based on
territorial considerations.
The earliest stage of Javanese political development--that charac-
teriing the neolithic root gardeners--is lost in the mists of pre-
history. On the basis of a distributional analysis, Ralph iUntqn has
described these groups as having very weak political leadership of any
sort, "rule being by family heads in a sort of oligarchic arrangement,
with, perhaps, nominal chiefs whose powers were mainly advisory ."36
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Judging by contemporary slash-and-burn groups, somewhat stronger political
leadership maust have emerged in the subsequent stage, though the inability
of slash-and-burn to support a non-cultivating elite limited develop-
ment here too. Present day shifting cultivators in Borneo, Burma and
Sumatra often show, nevertheless, a fairly strong chiefly leadership
within single villages and the development, through marriage alliances
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among separate chiefs within a region, of an embryonic ruling class.
The further concentration of population correlated with wet rice
growing tended to lead to an increased power for the tribal chiefs within
a more stable and sedentary (but by no means completely so) village
pattern by permitting the production of greater surpluses as grist for
the political mill.38 Thus emerged a form of political structure still
characteristic, under later accretions, of village organization in the
wet rice regions of Malaysia today--as the more intensive patterns of
rice cultivation are but specific elaborations of an originally gener-
alized form of land-use, so the complex, sedentary, over-crowded villages
of modern Java are but descendents of a more generalized type. The
best examples of this ancestral political form are, perhaps, the so-
called barangay units as they were encountered in the costal regions of
the Philippine Islands by the first European explorers .39
A barangay is a small group of people living in one area, growing
wet rice and following, usually, a single leader. They are either his
kinsmen, his slaves, or his economic dependents (who may, of course,
have slaves of their own), i.e., the group is composed of a dominant
group of bilaterally re.lated kinsmen with a head whose position is
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usually semi-inherited, plus a group of people, some of whom also may
be -bilaterally related to one another ,40 who have, voluntarily or
involuntarily, come more or less into permanent relation with it either
for practical or agstical reasons. The basis of a barangay is, thus,
not so much territorial as personalistic. Whole barangay will often
move for economic, military, health, or even religious reasons; and
men (or groups of men) can, to a degree, leave one and join another.
The elaborate systems of labor exchange, carried out largely in
inter-familial terms, already mentioned as necessary to insure mobility
of this all important resource within the ecological unit are present.
Further, rank has now become attached to a traditionalized difference
of pertuisites within the village organization, which perquisites are
essentially rights over the disposition of labor. The leader has cer-
tain rights to personal corvee, natura head taxes figured in terms of
man-days of work and so forth. His family, secondary leaders (often
heads of competing families struggling for dominance) and successful
warriors have certain similar but less extensive rights. Common de-
pendents have labor obligations to the village generally and to its
leadership in particular but they have, also, a right to a certain
inalienable percentage of their own labor, which they apply to village
land. Slaves (usually war-captives) or parasitic hangers-on have few
rights at all, except for a certain maintenance from their masters.
Here, then, is an explicit institutionalization of the fusion between
control over labor and political status: authority Is defined in terms
of traditionalized rights to draw from the labor ppol incorporated in
the barangay.
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After the rise of the b (or some other, similar, unit),
Javanese political history splits into two sequences. On the one hand,
the increasingly endogamous chiefly class becomes stronger and individual
chiefs begin to gain some measure of leadership control over others by
means of bravery, wealth, kinship alliances, and mother wit, leading to
small regional chiefdoms, some of them growing eventually into the
larger city states of the Eindu period .41 On the other hand, village
political development continues, increasingly segregated from the elite
in spatial as well as social terns, as the sort of structure charac-
teristic of the barangay solidifies and becomes elaborated within the
developing ecological context already outlined. So there develops an
authority problem not only within the village, but within the supra-
village ruling class. And the adjustment of these two systems of
political power to one another--the establishment of stable authority
"elations between town and country--becomes a persistent concern for
both the gentry and the peasantry .42
The supra-village political leaders, the emerging kings, needed,
on the one hand, to collect around themselves a personal administrative
staff of specialized priests and warriors4 3 -- the one to sanctify their
authority and the other to enforce it--and, on the other hand, to tie
as meny of the barangay-type village units to themselves as they could
in order to support this staff in the style to which it becomes inm
creasingly accustomed. They mst, in ihort, gain some share in the
traditionalized distribution of labor rights within the village, or,
as labor rights and political authority are fused within these local
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units, they must share in the sovereignty of the village chief From
the king's point of view, his authority problem is to hold his staff
loyal to him (which is, in part, dependent upon his being able to support
them), and to gain the allegiance of the local chiefs so that he can
share in the labor resources of their villages. From the chief "s point
of view, his authority problem is to resist, so far as possible, external
drains on local labor(for this is a direct drain on his own sovereignty),
while still providing his village members with sufficient military
(and religious) protection against external threats to their security.
Between any particular king and any particular chief (or viJllage council),
there arises a bargaining relation in which the strength of the former
lies in his military and religious power and the strength of the latter
lies in the labor resources of his village.
The early political history of Java consists, then, of a competitive
struggle between nascent religio-political centers for the adherence of
the various still not entirely sedentary barangay-type local units, which
latter may be seen as traditionalistically bound packages of labor. The
so-called states were not territorial units, but loose congeries of
villages tied to a common urban center for military and religious reasons--
we shall deal with the religious element later--each urban center competing
with others for ascendancy. Whatever degree of hegemony prevailed depended
not on the administrative organization of extensive territory under a
single king, but on the reputations of various kings to mobilize and apply
an effective striking force with which to :,ack and burn rebellious villages
or rival kingdoms.dd Insofar as the pattern was territorial at all, it
consisted of a series of concentric circles of religio-political power
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spreading out around the city-state capital, as radio waves spread from
a transmitter. Thus the closer a village to town the closer its ties
(i.e., the weaker its bargaining position) to the king; and, conversely,
the greater the development of the urban ruling group--priests, soldiers,
nobles, and king--the greater the strength and the greater the effective
range of its circles of outward spreading power.
So arises, gradually by fits and starts, the still crucial split
between what the Javanese traditionally call negara, which means, roughly,
the central government,4 5 and what they call desa, which means village.
The distinction is one between an urban-based system of power and a
village-based one, relations between them being in terms of a mutual
adjustment in proportion to their relative strength. Although the
latter was always subordinate in the sense of being always the weaker
party in the relationship (at times, particularly between the fall of
Madjapahit and the rise of Mataram, :-an-y villages were most likely,
independent of any negara at all, thus returring to the pre-kingdom
situation), the relation was not a simple hierarchical one, but rested
on a division of sovereignty--i.e., control over labor--between two
semi-independent political systems. Consequently, to trace the further
evolution of authority relations after the rise of the kingdoms and the
split between peasantry and gentry, it is necessary first, to outline
the development of such relations within the desa-village; second, to
describe their development within the urban-based bureaucratizing central
government; and, third, to set forth the changes in the form of politico-
economic relations between these two socially and spatially separated
institutional loci of government.
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The village was, for its part, radically affected by the three
interdependent factors whose operation of the ecological level we have
already seen as leading to a solidification of the originally loose-
woven and flesible patterns: the progressive intensification of agri-
culture, contact with the West, and the spectacular population growth.
The progressive intensification of agriculture led to an increasingly
sedentary settlement pattern, for it implied a progressively heavier
capital investment in land improvement, such as irrigation systems and
terraces, so tying t'e peasant more firmly to his land and destroying
the barangay's original nobility.46 Villages grew larger, not only
because of the increased population, but because of central government
pressures for more easily manageable administrative units, particularly
during the Culture System period when the direct subservience of the
desa to the negara was at its greatest. And all three factors together
brought about the development of patterns expressing authority relations
in terms of land rights to supplement the traditional patterns expressing
then in terms of labor rights, the two sorts of pattern then fusing to
the point where differential access to land, labor, and authority cone
to be reflected in a single system of social relationships.
In these developed, sedentary villages, political status ac cam
to be defined in terms of land tenure. The "core villagers," as they
are sometimes called 47 who were usually considered to be descendants
of the village's founders, were held to be proprietors of the land
which they "cmned" in common. Often the irrigated land (sawah) was
rotated every year among the group of core villagers, less often the
unirrigated land (tegal) as well (house gardens--pekarangan--seen always
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to have been individually owned). As time passed, particularly as the
anti-landholding pressures of the Culture System relaxed, the individual
core villagers came to hold fixed plots of sawah in perpetuity which,
though they could pass then to their sons, they could not otherwise
alienate, while tegal became, in may cases, simple personal property ,48
If the villager died without issue, emigrated, or comitted a serious
crime against the comuni ty, his communal land returned to the village.
The village then alloted it--in an open meeting of all the core villagers--
to someone else, usually someone who had lived for a long time in the
village, held house land, but had no comunal rights (no individual
could, in general, have more than one share. in such land). In addition
to this land, there was land, usually a somewhat larger parcel, often a
very such larger parcel, set aside for the use of the village chief.
Other such parcels were set aside for other members of the village
government and, sometimes, for special uses such as support of mosque
officials, payment for those who worked on village public works, and
so forth. Thus there grew up a system in which class standing, essen-
tially a ranking of families, was based on landholding. At the top was
the village head, below him the other village officials, then the holders
of village-ftned smah, then the holders of tegal only (in some cases
village owned, in most cases not), then those with pekarangan only, and
then those with nothing--people who, like the hangers-on of the old
barana days, merely boarded with others.
Labor patterns expressing intra-village authority differences did
not disappear however: obligations to work on village public works was
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correlated with the type of landholding, and labor obligations to
village chiefs persisted until the Dutch insisted upon their abrogation
toward the end of the nineteenth century. But more than this, the
elaboration of share-crop tenancy patterns within a productive process
in relation to which both land and labor are in heavy demand is essen-
tially a mesas by which rights over land and labor can be fused. The
tenant's share is fixed, more or less traditionally, not in the sense of
a return for his contribution to the output, but in the sense of an
inalienable right to a certain percentage of his own labor, the rest
of it belonging to his superiors; and the owner 's share in a continuation
of the rights of a higher status individual in the labor of a lower one.
If the situation were one of a free land and labor market in a
condition of an over-supply of labor, then one would expect a growing
concentration of landholding, a falling of the price of labor toward,
subsistence, a sharpening of class antagonisms between a class of large
landlords, and a swelling of the landless proletariat. But, though
landlessness has indeed markedly increased, though returns to labor
have indeed fallen, this marxist bifurcation has not occurred. Con-
centration of landholding has not markedly increased but rather decreased
as holdings have fragmented;49 the real per-unit returns to landholders
have not radically increased in proportion to the real per-unit returns
to the holders of labor; 5 0 and the landless have not lost their bargaining
power because, as I stressed above, labor has not become as simply
superabundant as a cursory glance would make it appear. The landholder
still needs the laborer almost as much as the laborer needs the land-
holder.
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Again, a genuinely alienated and politically disinherited agri-
cultural proletariat has, no doubt, begun to appear in this century,
especially in the plantation areas;51 but the capacity of the village
econo to absorb an increase in population through an intensification
of agriculture has been matched on the political level by the ability of
the status structure to adapt to a more complex pattern of social
differentiation by means of a more carefully and subtly graded authority
continuum. We might call this development--metaphorically--a kind of
"intensification" of the class ladder, for what happens is that a few
broad distinctions are replaced by a multiplicity of smaller ones. The
growth of land-resting in mosy terms, of individual ownership, frag-
mentation and sale of land, and of wage labor, as well as refinements
in the tenancy system have all tended to further this "Intensification"
rather than to break down the system and lead to a stmple two-class
opposition between haves and have-nots. In an extreme case, but not
necessarily a rare one, one piece of land, less than an acre in size,
might have an owner, a renter, a major tenant, a subtenant, and a wage
worker all drawing shares of its output, which shares though they are
unequal are not radically so, a situation reflecting, also, the authority
relations between those participating in this common land-labor pool;
their participation being carefully regulated in social terms, as I
have pointed out, to prevent any sharp concentration of rights, and
so of political power.
Turning now to the supra-village system of power, the negara, we
see a similar "solidification" process taking place under similar
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pressures. After the fall of adjapahit and the relativel brief period
of political and commercial efflorescence on the north coast, the great
inland kingdom of Mataram mnaged to build the most stable pre-colonial
administrative bureaucracy. 5 2 By so doing they stabilised, also, the
circular waves of poer pattern characteristic of their predecessors.
The "kingdom" was divided into three concentric circles: the
the capital palace-city itself (which was located in what is now the
Jogjakarta area); the negara agung, the "large (big, great) negara,"
which comprised the area surrounding the capital as far out as the king
had firm control; and the uantja negara, "outside the nea" which
included areas where his pwer was enough respected to earn him a certain
quantity of tribute, but over which his administrative control was
weak or n-existent .5 3
The higher status members of the King's staff were still confined
to the negara proper--they had to spend each night within the palace--
and were divided into an "outside" and an "inside" section. The "inside"
section was concerned with regulating the court-city itself (i.e., as
police, financial advisors, *eremonial leaders, etc.), the "outside"
section with treating with the villages in the negara agung The members
of the staff fell into one of two--rather antagonistic--groups: either
they were members of the king's family (figured bilaterally four gener-
ations up and dowa) or of the emerging bureaucracy, which, though its
members bore titles according to rank and tended to be succeeded in
office by their sons, was staffed with non-relatives and headed by the
prime minister, a mna whose power nearly equalled, sometimes exceeded,
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that of the king himself. Thus, the administrative staff tended to be
characterized by an inherent conflict between the emerging bureaucracy,
the individual offices of which, for the most part, were hereditary in
different families, and the king 'a family (which, with the numr of
the king 's wives, was always quite large), with the king, as head of
both, trying to harmonize them.
The "outside" administrative staff, divided into various functional
and areal departments, had graded ranks, the lower officials being per-
mitted to sleep outside of the capital. This bureaucracy was confined
in its activities entirely to the n ; the maa ezara was ruled
by a set of semi-independent princes, most of whom had donated daughters
54to the harem of the Mataram king, who more or less ran their aen bailiwicks,
their own little 2 In their own way. As a matter of fact, may
of the higher officials of the bureaucracy ruling the nM _g seen,
judging from their titles, to have formerly been such semi-independent
princes in the area and to have been subjugated by Mataran, the symbol
and guarantee of their subservience being residence in the iatara capital.
Thus the border marking the end of the neara & and the beginning of
the mantla seems to have been dependent upon the degree to which
the Mataran-kimg could, militarily or eoonomically, induce distant princes
to offer not only tribute to his court, but themselves.
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but themselves.
The Dutch moved in on this system from the north coast. First
they reduced all of the semi-independent princes and then they attacked
mataram itself. Victorious, they initiated a dual administrative system--
usually miscalled indirect rule--which consisted of a native civil
service with a Dutch civil service alongside of (and on top of) it. The
independent princes were left nominally in charge of their areas, but
a Dutch civil servant was put next to them as an "older brother"--he
was called a Resident, his Javanese "younger brother" a Regent--to
pressure them "gently" in the directions determined by Dutch policy.
Nataram was forcibly divided into two separate states, Jogjakarta and
Surskara and split along the grain of its administrative weakness: the
bureaucracy was pried out from under the king's control--initially by
naking the prime minister responsible to the Company, ultinately by
severing the connection between the king and his staff entirely--leaving
the king and his family free to cultivate the arts, religion, and a
genteel politesse, to which the new civil bureaucracy, still semi-
hereditary, could continue to look, in part, for a style of life model
but not for orders. The negara was now but a cultural center; the
political center was first the kumpeni, after its fall the gupermen. 5 5
This form of government continued up to the time of the Japanese
occupation: a rationally organized dual bureaucracy ruling in terri-
torial terms, or at least appearing to do so. The old hierarchy of
native officials, souswhat simplified, was preserved but graded in terns
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of descending territorial range of responsibility, rather than according
to the nuamber of villages under their control 5 6 -- thus completing the
shift from personalistic to territorial integration. But, as in the
desa case, the definition of authority in terms of territory (i.e.,
land) did not remove the personal (i.e., laboristic) element, but merely
fused it with the new pattern; the personalistic tie between leader
and follower persisted only slightly dimmed. Since the Revolution,
when the guperman became the pemerintah and the Dutch half of the
bureaucracy disappeared, access to the bureaucracy has become easier
and the social composition of the political elite has altered somwhat
as new roads to power and status--most crucially education-- open up
beside the traditional one of descent. But, Judging from the prevalence
of complaints by Indonesians of what they call bapakism (literally,
"father-ism") in the civil service, by which they mean a tendency toward
personalistic rather than "businesslike" ties between department heads
and their employees, the old patterns of authority have not, as yet,
entirely disappeared.
Turning, finally, to negara-desa authority relations, to the
distribution of power between rather than within these two loci of
government, we see, once again, a similar evolution. In the earliest
kingdom period, the main duty of the village to king was corvee, king 's
work as it was called, 5 7 either for public works, such as roads or
temples, for military service as foot soldiers, or as agricultural
workers producing food for the king's court. This work was but the
king's share in the village labor pool, in which the chief, various
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other local officials, and the mass of the villagers themselves also
had certain rights. The exact proportions of these different claims
to labordepended upon the relative power of the vi llage and the court
but the distribution tended to become traditionally fixed in the more
persistent Iago.
By the timm of Hataram, although the tie between king and village
was still personalistic, the claims on labor had begun to be expressed
in terms of land rights. The originally vague claim of the partially
migratory barangay to the general territory it occupied and of the
early city-states to the territory around their capitals developed into
a dual notion of who owned the land. On the one hand, the villagers
regarded the land, now no longer a free good though still rather abundan
as theirs by virtue of the fact that their ancestors had settled it, or,
at least, that this fact permnently guaranteed their right to use it.
The king, however, regarded all land within the kingdom--even in the
mantja nega--as his by divine right, given out in loan to the peasants
who were working it .58
These two theories of land rights were not so much in direct oppo-
sition as they appear; they represented merely the intersection of
different perspectives, the peasant notion of village independence and
the king's notion of universal sovereignty. A peasant could hold both
that the land was his and that it was his king's with little intellectual
strain. It was his because his forefathers had cleared it and no one
could prevent him from working it; it was the king 's by divine right,
and so the king had a right in a share of its output. Perhaps the best
analogy to this situation are those Christians who believe in personal
53
private property but yet believe all things belong ultimately to God and
so dedicate a portion of their personal property to Him as a symbolic
acceptance of His ultimate sovereignty over all things. As the king, as
we shall see, was viewed as a gods the parallel is not entirely inexact;
though the peasant 's contribution could hardly be said to be voluntary.
Out of this dual land-ownership theory grew the so-called appanage
system. In the appanage system the land of each village was considered
divisible into five parts (land was first measured in the Demak period--
i.e., about 1525--just prior to the rise of Mataraa 5 9 ). One-fifth of
the land was allotted to the villager who acted as the king's tax collector
in the village. In the simplest case this was the village head himself,
but in many villages, particularly those near the capital where the
king's strength was relatively greater, the king appointed whichever
village member would pay him most for the opportunity in advance, often
after prolonged bargaining with several petitioners. In fact, the area
allocated to a tax collector did not always, again especially near the
court, coincide with village boundaries so that a tax collector might be
awarded two villages or one and a half, or even one-half. Where the
village head and tax collector were different individuals, the village
head had to make his claims for support, for a share in the village land,
directly against the peasants, and his position was necessarily weakened.
Of the remaining four-fifths of the land, half was given as appanage
to the king, half reserved to the villagers. The king's half was con-
verted into rice--half the harvest of the peasant 's land--and seems even
sometimes to have been converted into money (Spanish reals), though this
was most probably not very common. Thus the king's share of the land
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was 2/5 (really 3/5, if you count the tax collector's appanage), though
in poor land areas he sometimes only got 1/4 or 1/5. Originally , too,
the king ignored non-rice crops, leaving those wholly to the peasant;
but after 1743 he took 1/3 of then, too. Thus, once more, was control
over land and over labor fused into a single pattern reflecting the
structure ot authority.
The king *s appanage rights were then, in part, distributed both
to menbers of his family and to mebers of the bureaucracy as payment
for their services and as the price of their loyalty. But because
authority, land rights, and labor rights were so wrapped up together,
this was actually a division of his sovereignty among his dependents,
an exact reverse of the situation, as Furnivall has pointed out, in
feudal Europe:
When a ruler granted a district or a village to a dependent,
he did not transfer either the people or the land as so much
property, but he transferred part of his sovereignty. later,
when the Dutch made grants of land, the people went with the
land, but that was a European idea; formerly under native
rule the land went with the people. The social tie was strictly
personal and in no way based on land; in feudal Europe a man
was liable to service because he held land, but in Java a man
held land because he was liable to service, and this psuedo-
feudalism was in fact the direct contrary of feudalism .60
Again, the Dutch moved in on the system from the north pressing
Ntaram in tight around its capital and awarding the king 's appanage
rights to private Chinese, French, English, and Dutch entrepreneurs
who thus became sovereigns over clusters of villages, drawing for them-
selves the 2/5 !!Ma share and paying rent for the privilege of doing
so to the Company. Some of the Dutch entrepreneurs after a while decided
that it would be more profitable not merely to take 2/5 of the rice crop
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output, but to claim 1/2 of the land of each of their subject peasants 6 1
and require them to grow specified cash crops an the entrepreneur 's half,
leaving them free to do as they wished with the other half. Later, when
the Company went under and the excess of the Chinese and Dutch petty
sovereigns became too flagrant, the Culture System continued this same
practice in the name of the Colonial Government. Thus the Culture System,
far from being a new invention of Dutch administrators, was merely the
continuation of old negara prerogatives under a now, foreign sovereign.
In may ways, the more modern practices of the sugar companies, renting
1/3 of the peasant 's land each year for sugar, was only a further refine-
ment of the same system.
But, as Mataram's territory contracted and the Dutch appropriated more
and more of the island's agricultural surplus, the king's administrative
staff had increasingly to be paid by salary rather than appanage, and
incorporation into the Colonial Government as a civil service completed
this transition. Thus, the growth of a genuinely landed aristocracy, a
rural gentry, was inhibited, in the first place, by a political system
based on personal ties rather than land ownerwhip and by the need of the
kings to keep high staff members within the palace; and, in the second
place, by the transformation of the king's personal staff into a salaried
bureaucracy. Even today there is no rural gentry of any strength in most
of Java, 6 2 though civil servants often own and let out to tenants (still
on a half-half basis) an acre or two of village land. 6 3 But, as population
has grown, the village agricultural surplus has shrunk and the bureaucracy--
now expanding by leaps and bounds--is today supported mainly by heavy taxes
on what is left of the largely foreignm-ed export seotor of the ecaoumWw
and by a growing government deficit, while the domestic agricultural sector
of the eccuonW goes largely untaxed.
IV. Patterns of Urbanization
Java, a frank--if somewhat uncouth--Portuguese explorer wrote in
the sixteenth century is like a mother pig: to the south is her bony
razor back (by which he meant the arid, limestone dominated, largely
harborless southern coast), In the center is her soft rice-plain underbelly,
and in the north are her teats, from which her substance is sucked.
Accordingly, the earlier phases of urbanization in Java are marked by
the growth of two types of towns: the castle towns of the river valley
interior and the bazaar towns of the north coast maritime region. The
castle towns were, as we have seen, the, capitals of the early kingdoms
(the n administrative, aesthetic,and religious centers for the
villages within their sphere of influence; while the bazaar towns were
trading stations, coimrcial and shipping centers along the southern
edge of the Malacca to Spice Islands sea street. In the succeeding
phases of urban development, interstitial "secondary" and "tertiary"
towns spring up among these two "primary" types, which secondary and
tertiary towns are loosely integrated composites of elements from each
of the primary types and from the villages. In the most modern stage,
the north coast ports develop into cosmopolitan "great cities" which,
though they are the political and commercial centers for the entire island,
are almost as much oriented toward the outside world as toward their own
hinterlands; the castle centers become inland provincial capitals with
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a persisting, but perhaps declining, cultural influence. And some
of the secondary towns become somewhat specialized economically, though
this process has not gone very far. 6 6
The earliest hinduistic temple remains--for exampleythose on the
Dieng plateau which are above the range of effective wet-rice agriculture--
probably represented pilgrimage sites, empty towns of the sort we know
from the Maya.67 Such "towns" may not have been true urban units in
that, except for a few priests (some dwellings have been excavated in
Dieng), probably no one lived in them and they were used only periodically
for worship purposes by people farming the slightly lower valleys nearby.
However that may be, as temples were constructed in the lowlands, we
can assume that those politically responsible for them lived around thom,
that the chief who would be king had built himself some sort of capitol,
be it only an ostentatious elaboration of the traditional village chief's
house, and that, consequently, a true town had begun to develop,,
At this stage, the difference between a village and a town would
not be sharp: contrasts in dress, housingor general style of life
would still be relatively small. In time, however, there would develop
the kind of town we know from Madjapahit and Mataram, one in which the
castle--the political capitol--not merely dominates the town but is
the town. The castle walls now enclose the temples, the craft workshops
(where such arts as puppet making, lost wax textile dyeingand ceremonial
spear and dagger casting are pursued), the barracks of the military
Sadertihip, tUe royal rice graneries, the residencea of the high adminis-
Irat ors and prince y noIb lt y and, a-s the cn tr, the king"a chamber
and harm- Hr, thoug-h a, few common p m y gather outaide the
walls, the di tinction between urban gentry and village peasantry has
now become quite sharp Wihin the walls of a enclosed politico-religious
urba unit u a uore of art mystiets and political organi~
zation~ quite erinto t-he tra~ditionaxlly orgia.Azed vt'lage- Against
the "little tradition" of the countrysidue r the "great tradition"
of the towns-
The isoa ion of the earlest of these states in th-e interior of
Central J4ava NAus tamde them eul turally rather homogeneous and
-ontainedo~ but as tbe later Eastern kingdoms-Singhasari, Kadiri,
Madjapahit--mno'ed down the Brantas toeards the sea, this homogeneity and
segregation from the outside world was progressively lost; and with
the rise of the port kingdoms themselves (Surabaja, Demak, Tuban, etc.)
It disappeared almost altogether. The shifting of the economic center
of gravity away from the inland rice areas toward the north coast was
connected, on the economic level, not only with the development of
greater technological skill in irrigation, but with a reaching out of
the expanding ruling class to control another, non-agricultural form
of wealth: International maritime trade.
In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries East Asian trade steadily
increased in importance, though it had been of significance since the
time of Chtrit at least and busy port towns seem to have existed, par-
t iula~r y In Suma tva, even beffor e the arrival of the hindus 69 The
leadership, the royal rice graneries, the residences of the high adminis-
trators and princely nobility, and, as the center, the king's chamber
and harem. Here, though a few common people may gather outside the
walls, the distinction between urban gentry and village peasantry has
now become quite sharp. Within the walls of an enclosed politico-religious
urban unit occurs a fluorescence of art, mysticism and political organi-
zation quite foreign to the traditionally organized village. Against
the "little tradition" of the countryside arises the "great tradition"
of the towns
The isolation of the earliest of these states in the interior of
Central Java u=st have made then culturally rather homogeneous and
self-contained but as the later Eastern kingdos--Singhasari, Kadiri
Madjapahit--moved down the Brantas towards the sea, this homogeneity and
segregation from the outside world was progressively lost; and with
the rise of the port kingdoms themselves (Surabaja, Demak, Tuban, etc.)
it disappeared almost altogether. The shifting of the economic center
of gravity away from the inland rice areas toward the north coast was
connected, on the economic level, not only with the development of
greater technological skill in irrigation, but with a reaching out of
the expanding ruling class to control another, non-agricultural form
of wealth: international maritime trade.
In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries East Asian trade steadily
increased in importance, though it had been of significance since the
time of Christ at least and busy port towns seem to have existed, par-
ticularly in Sumatra, even before the arrival of the hindus.69 The
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stimulus toward expansion appears in the main, to have come from the
growing demand for Asian goods in the commercial centers of Renaissance
Europe. Over a trade route which Schriehe has traced as running fton East
Asia to Cambay to Aden to Cush to Alexandria to Venice, 7 0 the spices,
textiles, ivory and jewels of Asia flowed toward Europe and some of the
luxury goods of Europe flowed back (trade within Asia was, of course,
lively too). It was. a trade which rested, as van Leur has emphasized,
not -n bulk transactions, but on the transport of rare commodities in
small amounts at high profit margins--he calls it, aptly, international
peddling and quotes Gibbon: "the objects of oriental trade were splendid
and trifling."7 1 It was a commerce in the objects of conspicuous display,
not, for the most part, of subsistence--a world-wide traffic in the symbols
of political domination and class superiority. The hindu style of life
was now set off with the baubles of China, Arabia, and even of Europe;
and in Venice and Genoa spices from the East Indies graced Doge tables.
With the weakening of the early maritime kingdoms of Sumatra and the
expansion of rice cultivation on Java, the growing inland states of the
latter island made their bid to get a political strangle hold on this
trade. For a time, Madjapahit succeeded, Javanese shipping--mostly within
the archipelago--flourished, and the north coast ports grew rapidly in
size. Presently, however, these expanding port kingdons shook themselves
free of Madjapahit domination and there came to exist a series of inde-
pendent or semi -independent bazaar city-states stretching along the edge
of the Java sea from Bantam in the West to Panarukan in the East. Here,
around "Asia 's Mediterreanean," grew up a kind of Far Eastern Laevant:
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Countless markets, lying isolated from each other
and varying greatly from one another in structure.
A few hundred bahar of spices, a few thousand bags
of pepper, a few hundred packs of cloth, a few dozen
g of porcelain, a few dozen picul of wood products
an each market. An international trade of person-to-
person haggling and retail sales with hand scales or
via the town weigh-house or the government toll house,
carried on in the periods when trade was concentrated
in the towns because of favorable winds and the harvests
there. When the traders were gone and the money brought
along had been put to use or spent, trade came to a
standtill. 7 2
Mercantilism thus replaced agrarianism .as the economic ethos and
a whole new way of life appeared. Oriented outward toward the sea,
toward movement rather than stability, toward cosmopolitanism rather
than isolationism, this was a far more dynamic kind of culture than
that of the self-absorbe4 inland kingdoms. Further, this culture was
not simpiLy Javanese but international. Though Javanese sailors and
traders played an important part in it, particularly in the earlier states
(there was a large Javanese colony in Malacca, the most important bazaar
state of all), the main local carriers of this expanding culture were
the Malays of West Indonesia and Malaya and the Macassarese and Bugis
of South Celebes. And from outside the archipelago came Gujeratis,
Tamils, Chinese, Arabs, Turks, and ultimately, Europeans , The result
was the growth of what might be called the "mosaic" pattern of urban
life of the sort particularly common in the Middle East . The port
cities were composed of a set of ethnically homogeneous neighborhoods
each more or less politically and socially self-contained and largely
concerned with the intricacies of cut-throat commerce, relations among
the separate groups being almost wholly economic and being carried out
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in a form of bastardised, "market" Malay in which the only really in-
portent phrases were "how much?" and "too much.'
But in addition to the bazaar element, the castle element was present
too, representing the attempt of the rice-supported native aristocracy,
originally in the name of adjapahit, later as independent princedoms,
to gain political control over the trade The bazaar cities seem to
have consisted of a walled castle-estate, modeled on the inland cities,
73in which a king-sometimes several in a kind of collegial arrangment-
resided, surrounded-outside the walls--by various neighborhoods, each
of %ich tended to be composed of traders of a single nationality:
Chinese, Ghjeratis, Arabs, Malays, etc. These neighborhoods possessed a
kind of extra-territoriality, being directly ruled, insofar as they
were ruled at all, by a "captain" chosen from among them. The bazaar
cities were thus not unified political entities at all: there was no
simple sovereignty but rather a balance of power among merchant princes
from various religious, racial, and national groups. The castle-dwelling
king attempted to establish his pre-eminence, not only directly by
controlling the trade of his own national group, the Javanese, but by
mobilizing rice surpluses from villages under his control further inland;
but his relation to the more important foreign traders was not as lord
to subject but as merchant to merchant. To mediate between the groups
there grew up, not only a fairly complex commercial system based on
74
written contracts, letters of credit, and rational accounting, but also
a group of go-between officials such as the shahbandar, a sort of market
adminstrator, or the mantri, a kind of politico-economic euuisary,
jobs as often as not held by foreigners. 7 5
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Dutch hegemony along the coast did not alter the basic structure
of the bazaar states--a Dutch neighborhood, often called the "new town"
and rather maladaptively designed in imitation of the towns of non-tropical
Rollod'6 was simply added to the rest and the headquarters of the Company
built large enough to dominate the castle--but the Javanese role within
these states declined radically in importance Large-scale Javanese
trade collapsed almost entirely under the resurgence of inland agrarianism,
the diversion of much of the trade to ports in Borneo and the Celebes,
and the reduction of local kings to lackeys of the East India Company.
The main beneficiaries of this turn away from trade by the Javanese were,
in addition to the Dutch, the Chinese. Even before the European incursion,
the Chinese, who had been trading to the archipelago since before the time
of Christ, were perhaps the most important foreign group in the bazaar
states, often living within the castle walls, advising the local king
and maintaining close commercial ties with merchants in China. Asiatic,
but bound neither by the ritualistic constraints of Hinduism or the
legalistic ones of Islam; economically skilled and marvellously adept
at political fence-sitting; tightly organized and industrious to a fault;
and, perhaps most important, possessed of a calm sense of their own
cultural superiority to both the Dutch and the Javanese, they were Java's
most successful "marginal men." As such, the Dutch soon found the"
indispensable as intermediaries between themselves and the native popu-
lation, fulfilling economic and political functions Europeans could or
would ~not fulfill themseiveW
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As the bazaar city-states weakened, Mataram arose inland, marked
by an aggressive agrarianism, a sharp hostility to trade as both foreign
and degrading and a firm resolution to re-purify and re-vitalize the
castle-city !eara ruling tradition.7 9  It was as though these castle
kings, princes, priestsand soldiers had been tempted by the glitter
of international trade, had abandoned their quiet isolation and religlo-
aesthetic purity to reach out into an essentially foreign environment
to grasp this trade and, having had their fingers badly burned and their
pride severely damaged, were now retreating in bitter regret amid avowals
of "never again." But when the Dutch, having consolidated their hold
on the north coast, turned toward the interior of the island te destroy
Mataram, they brought much of the bazaar rabble with them. Resident
Chinese (many of them born in Indonesia) began to trade in the interior
courts and to rent captured appanages from the Company, thus initiating
the development of the wholesale-retail distributive apparatus they
still control in Java, an apparatus transferring commercial crops from
Javanese hands to Dutch ones as well as, to a much lesser extent, in-
ported goods from Dutch hands to Javanese ones. Pious moslem petty
traders, the remnants of the once powerful Javanese trading group,
along with Arabs, also penetrated the hinterlands in search of small
profits here and there in the countryside, travelling halfway across
Java for a few cents gain and bringing trade not only to the inland
towns but to the villages as well: the Javanese word for trade
or (as dagang) trader, still also means "foreign" or "foreigner,"
as well as "wanderer" or "tramp' Thus, the north coast came to the
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interior, and what had begun as an effort of the rice kings to domimate
the foreign trade economy ended with a penetration of that moenoI into
the agricultural basins themselves, an addition of the basear or 2
(the native word for market) element to the negara and des elements
in the Javanese social structure.
Actually, the or market element added another kind of band
between and dos besides that already described; for, although
its main locus remained in the tomns, and continues to do so today; it
touched at least lightly on even the most isolated villages, The traveling
peddlers going out from the market centers stimulated village trading
(and, consequently, the rise of at least part-time village traders)
both in cash crops and in the products of small village home industry--
textile weaving and dyeing, brick-making, cigarette manufacturing,
80bamboo-all weaving, coconut-oil mking, basket weaving-setting up a
rural-urban relationship not focused around differential political rights
to labor, around inequalities in military and religious power, but around
the more equalitarian, every-man-for-himself implicat ions of hand-to-mouth
comerce of the small volume, rapid turnover, speculative sort The
first kind of tow-country bond, that stated in terms of class and unequal
political authority, remained strong, of course, and tended to shape
the second, never sort of linkage in its image. But, although they were
of the towns, the quasi-foreiga Javanese traders and, most especially,
the genuinely foreign Arab and Chinese traders could not really take on
8la
the status trappings of the nobility. And so there came into existence
a whole range of rural-urban types of relationships varying between the
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negara and R poles, a set of social, economic and political ties
within which the formal, personalistic. and hierarchical emphasis of the
king to follower relationship and the informal, impersonal equalitarian
emphasis of the peddler to peddler relationship varied in their relative
strength
The almost purely political relationship between the noble turned
civil servant and the common peasant represented the one extreme; the
almost purely economic relationship between Chinese storekeeper and
Javanese buyer (or seller) represented the second. The first involved
a refined dialogue of genteel indirection, a subtle expression of the
rights and duties incumbent upon different positions In a sharply hier-
archical status structure; the second was carried on as a direct (though
not necessarily frank), down-to-earth, dollars-and-cents dialegue be-
tween two people more or less explicitly out for their own advantage,
each of whom suspected, correctly, that the other would deceive him if
he could. The social interaction between noble and peasant was care-
fully regulated in terms of a complex status etiquette which emphasized
the delicacy of the emotional relationship between the participants, an
etiquette which permeated all aspects of their behavior, even the ian
guistic82 constantly stressing the greater religious, aesthetic, politi-
cak and social standing of the civil servant in relation to the peasant.
The Chinese-Javanese relationship lacked this hyper-concern for the
correctness of speech and behavior and for emotional niceities almost
altogether; and there was little acknowledgement of cultural superiority
on either side: the Chinese considered the Javanese peasant a credulous
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end unlettered lout, ridiculously easy pickings for .a clever businessmen;
the Javanese thought the Chinese a narrow, materialistic foreigner with
little interest in the higher things of life, hardly advanced over the
animals .
These, however, were the extremes: most of the rural-urban social
relationships were a fusion of the two. They were not merely political
ties and not erely commercial ones, but something of both. Luxury
goods associated with the courts--particularly, fine textiles--tended to
be hawked in a manner quite similar to the way in which the civil servant
governed (and often by the wives of the civil servants), the economic
element being muted by a context of complex politesse. The Javanese
urban peddlers, though much readier to sacrifice cultural form to eco-
nomic substance than either the peasants or the aristocrats, were still
not as completely insensitive to the demands of tradition as the Chinese
or Arabs could be. On the village side, there arose a group of half-
time traders and small handicraft manufacturers who, though still basically
peasants, were able to free themselves to some extent from traditional
constraints and represent their follows in the world of the market, if
not to the Chinese directly, then at least to the native trading class
S3in town. Later, when displaced peasants began to drift into the towns
to seek work as coolies, small craftsman, servants,and so forth, a similar
mixture of peasant ideas of "proper" interpersonal behavior and the
ommesrcial ethic occured. Thus, there developed an urban occupational
structure in which individual roles varied in their political e
(or des) element and their commercial Ep element, according both
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to the sort of occupation involved--civil servant, trader, coolie-and
the social and cultural status of the individuals occupying them--Chinese,
Javanese aristocrat, peasant; the two being rather highly correlated.
Town development proceeded, as the Colonial Period wore on, in
terms of a crystallization of this generalized occupational structure:
again a progressive solidification and rigidification of an originally
loosely integrated pattern. The increased population, the greater
complexity of political administration and the burgeoning of comercial
activity all stimulated the growth of secondary and tertiary "feeder"
towns at junctures in the evolving transportation network, which towns
were composed of elements from a desa, and esar pressed together
in rather haphazard fashion. The lead in town development seems commonly
to have been taken by the negara (or, more exactly, guprmen) element,
by the steadily rationalizing bureaucracy cutting deeper and deeper
into the peasant mass. When the Dutch began to remake the indigenous
aristocracy into a civil service they placed the head office of the
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whole apparatus in Batavia, a city they had largely built themselves,
turned the major castle towns and bazaar towns into provincial capitols
and transformed the seats of the old independent or semi-independent
secondary princes into sub-provincial regional capitols; but they soon
found that this loosely woven urban structure was too coarse a net
for their increasingly detailed administrative purposes. Stimulated
by such evolving governmental functions as those for supervizing forced
crop programs, for collecting taxes, for protecting and servicing Dutch
rnusin'ess- Sen fAd their I nteVre fo"r - emn vtme rearn
roads and improving irrigation facilities, and for keeping the govextr-
mental ear somewhat closer to the ground, the civil tervice aS foc'ed
to differentiate and decentralize further, votting up branch distrIct
and sub-district offices every twenty miles or ,;o (the density varied
of course, with the population density) oatrtd the nountryside, and
around these branches the n-e secodr a iy
The plaing of a branch of fice of h buaucracy in a v itage
resulted not in an establihent of a rural etry- wa too la4te for,3
that, and besides the policy of rotating v servants amcng tows made
it more or less impossible--but in the trasformation of the village
into a town,- a removal of it from the desa realm into the realm of the
negara, The district or sub-district office established, the pasar
people came next, assured of government protection. Chinese-stwes
soon lined the main roads, a native market, dominated by the roving
85Javanese traders was net up (commonly, the towns in one area would
form a rotation cycle, each holding a market on a different day of the
five-day week, the traders moving about from one to the next), the
small craftsmen--tailors and carpenters most ly-oulId begin to appear,
The town pattern tended to be determined in ter of these various
components In the center of town, facing a wide square and shaded by
a huge banyan tree, mas the ran.ing civil servant 's foe and office,
surrounded by the homes and offices of otier governant officls (e,
the head of the governmenit paws hop or the opevator of the goverment
salt moopoly) and whatever i any) Dutchmsen lived in the tova (e g , ,a
NM
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supervisors of nearby plantations, sugar factory managers , railroad
directors, etc.). Along the main street(s) the Chinese lived in their
din warehouse-like stores while the native traders lived, along with
the Arabs, around the mosque, in the so-called kuman or moslem quarter
Inside the blocks fomed by the cross-cutting rectangular street grid
(the toe are almost always, especially in the lowlands, perfectly
squared off), behind the more imposing houses of the civil servants,
the Chinese and the richer traders which faced out to the streets, the
village people turned urban proletariat lived in bamboo huts These
enclosed living areas, bounded by the back walls of the more well-to-do,
were called kpongs (neighborhoods), had a good deal of internal inte-
gration, and were, it effect, an attempt to maintain something of the
closed-society village atmosphere in the towns, to provide an element of
rural solidarity in a haphazardly urbanizing environment.
The building up of such an urban pattern was, once again, a process
In time and, once again, the process tended to take an involutional
form as the pattern became super-saturated, as a social form designed
to contain moderately high population densities was forced to absorb
enormously high ones. At first there would be only a district and/or
subdistrict office, two or three Chinese stores, the majority of traders
would be non-residents, merely passing through on market days or every
month or two as a stop on a wide-swinging circuit, and many, it not most,
of the village type people would continue to farm for at least part of
their income: a loose urban structure capable of expansion in any one
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of several directions and even of serious change in form. As the of-
fects of the colonial policies on the villages began to be felt toward
the end of the nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth centuries,
the civil service grew in sixe (and its social composition grew more
heterogeneous), its functions proliferating under the pressure of an
increased governmental concern for native welfare. At the same time,
the growth of Java 's export economy as the large plantations appeared
led to an increase in the number of traders and to a decline of the
itinerant pattern: markets came to be held every day rather than weekly
in mest towns and the majority of the traders began to settle down
permnently in one town or another, often setting up Chinese-type retail
stores, small factories (cigarettes, garment makipg., etc.),.-or become
craftsmen of one sort or another--barbers, tailors, bicycle repairmen,
etc. And the approach of the rural social structure toward its population
limits drove more and more displaced villagers into the towns looking
for work as servants to the Dutch or the civil servant class, as laborers
for the Chinese or Javanese businessmen, or as marginal craftsmen or
petty traders.
Here again, then, was a mature pattern where one would expect either
stabilization or serious structural change, but again neither occured,
perhaps in part because certain modes of response were automatically
denied the Javanese within the colonial plural-economy set-up, in part
because the prior rigidification of village life implied a reduction of
possibilities for change in the urban sector as well, and in part be-
cause the unavoidable influences from the West came too rapidly for
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smooth adjustment in any case. Alter 1920, the urban population growth
rate seMeS steadily to have increased in relation to the rural population
growth rate, a tendency culminating in the time of the Japanese occu-
pation and in the post-revolutionary period, when the movement of people
into the toens took on serious proportions. Thus, the logic of the
tremeans population growth, from which they had been in part shielded
by the remarkable labor absorbing powers of the villages, caught up
with the tomns and reproduced in them the kind of labor-swollen social
system characteristic of the rural sector.
The more strictly urban part of the increased town population, that
stming from the internal growth of the element of the population
itself, has been absorbed into the government bureaucracy which has
eXpanded into an enormously over-staffed monstrosity; but with the
shift of the basis of recruitment from descent to education, individuals
have increasingly been able to move from dest or p backgrounds
into occupations. The bureaucracy and the educational system
(also enormously expanded are locked in a self-perpetuating circle
of distention in which the second produces more and more diplomeed
graduates which the latter is forced to absorb. Consequently, the
embryonic rational bureaucratic element which seemed to be appearing
before the second world-war, the increased incorporation of estern
ideals of efficient and impersonal public administration into the ethics
of Mny of the leading civil servants, had been almost lost in a criss-
crossing of agenoies and offices, a spreading of the vork-load ever more
thinly through the whole structure, and a proliferation of meaningless
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activities designed to give people something to do--a situation which
naturally leads to a lowering of morale aAd a marked decrease in ad-
ministrative efficiency. 7
In the commercial sector, the flooding of former village people into
trading activities, as well as a growth in population of the urban
trading group itself, has led to an intensification of commercial aa-
tivities almost exactly parallel with the intensification of agrIcul-
tural activities in the rural sector: more people have been employed to
produce the sane output (i.e., handle the same fl.ow of goods) by dividing
the whole work-load into smaller and smaller tasks. There arises a
multiplication of middlemen, an extremely individuated patterns of
trade with mazium competition, maximum division of labor, minima volume
and minimum margins of profit, within which any tendency toward more
highly organized forms of economic activity-large stores, more rationally
organized factories--gets drowned, because when labor is so cbeap,
entreprenurial efforts, at least those of the sort designed to cut costs
by making labor more efficient, are not likely to lead to much advantage.
Similar processes have occured in the more proletarianised sectors
where each town has twice as many carpenters and four times as many
tailors as it can profitably employ.
Once again, it would be a dangerous half-truth to pranounce all
this "concealed unemployment" and to assume that all that ms needed
as industrial growth into which the excess labor could be drawn. As
in the rural case, the absorption of so much labor into a political
bureaucracy or a distributive apparatus does something to these structures
which makes a simple withdrawal of the labor again sonewhat difficult.
Granted that a pattern of civil administration is somewhat ante ameuable
to reform, is less inherently resistant to change, than a pattern of
ecological adaptation, where previous commitments get more directly
embodied in a concrete and functionally specific technical structure,
it is nevertheless true that the only reason why it would prove tre-
mendously difficult to cut down the number of Indonesian civil servants
is not merely that it would lead to tremendous political reactions
(which if there were alternative employment for them it might not do),
but that the whole administrative structure in some sense now needs
all these people in order to be able to operate with even as little
efficiency as it does.
The "drain off" theory not only assumes that people who leave
the bureaucracy will be those least needed there (the opposite seems
more likely: the more vigorous and imaginative are likely to leave for
new fields than the passive and security oriented), but also that in
a situation where its personnel is decreasing the bureaucracy will
naturally" reorganize in a more efficient manner. But, actually, in-
creasing efficiency with a smaller personnel implies a whole revolution
in the manner of doing business which a mere transfer of labor is not
likely to effect. Instead of twenty people coming late to the office,
working slowly and leaving early, you may find you have ten coming late
working slowly and leaving early with (though this reduction in numbers
might bring a few marginal savings, and would certainly ease the strain
on the government budget) an even lesa adequate work output.
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A similar argument can be developed for the distributive apparatus.
If the thousands of small marginal traders reaching into every mack and
cranny of Javanese town and village life are to be replaced, somO 8e0
extesively organized system will have to be developed which will be
able to get the natively produced cash crops out of peasant hands and
manufactured goods into them. Considering the fractionization of the
peasant sector into thousands of individual "owners" of villaO output.
this would not, on the fact of it , be an easy task and it is just possible-
one cannot be certain-that the development of large-scale, labarsaving
commercial organization implies similar reforms on the productive agri-
cultural end. In the manual labor "proletarianised" sector, especially
where labor unions support rigidities in the allocation of labor, the
same kind of inflexibility appears. In a sense, a modern industrial
plant implies a modern agriculture, a modern political bureaucracy and
a modern commercial system, and they all imply a revolution in social
organization and cultural outlook which, despite appearances, may be
rather further from occuring today in Java than they were several decades
ago.
There is an important, if only partial, exception to this picture
of rigidification, and it occurs in the major cities. Oa particularly
revealing characteristic of the more recent stages of the urbanizing
process in Java is that a great flow of urban migration is now not to
the small and mediun simed towns but to the larger cities, the former
S7a
castle towns, and bazaar towns. one reason for this may be that the
economic structure in these larger cities, containing as it does a
comparatively greater amount of medium industry and a much more highly
developed commrcial life (as well as more government Offices , is still
not so completely overdriven as that in the small towns, the situation
is more open ad flexible. One might say that the point of mumu
flexibility of the three types of system-the village, tow and city-
the point at which given access to Western economic patterns they might
most easily have made use of them, occured serially in time. For the
agricultural sector the crucial period seems to have been around the
time of the Culture System when a more extensive organization of agri-
culture would have been much more easily accomplished than it could be
now. In the smaller towns flexibility does not seem clearly to have
disappeared until toward the second and third decades of this century,
and so, compared with the countryside, the more labor intensive patterns
are perhaps even today not so deeply set, so resistant to reform.
In the case of the cities, the rapidity of the population increase--
three or fourfold in twenty-five years-means that the social and eco-
nomic structure of these metropolitan areas has not been able to re-
adjust so as to absorb all this excess labor; perhaps even had the increase
been spread over a longer period it still might not have been able to
absorb it. In any case, Java 's population Will soon be too great, if
it is not already, to be wholly absorbed anywhere through an intensifi-
cation of existing work patterns and so the problems of the cities are
likely simply to get progressively worse. Foreign observers of the
Indonesian scene who take comfort from the relatively higher level of
well-being which seems to exist in Java's villages and towns as compared
to her major cities, usually fall to realize that this comparative
well-being has been bought at the cost of a tremendous rigidification
of an essentially mI-adaptive pattern, the evil effects of which have
simply been transferred to the cities; that (relative) rural calm has
been bought at the expense of urban unrest.
V. Religious Patterns
To form a picture, however din, of the earliest stages of religious
development in Java, we must, once more, turn to Ralph Linton's reconstruction
of the basic stratum of Southeastern Asiatic culture. After reviewing the
distribution of "marginal" cultural elements among "isolated, culturally
conservative groups [speaking languages of the Malayo-Polynesian stock]
in remote Indonesian islands and in the mountains of Southeast Asia, "Linton
describes the religion of the pre-cereal root-crop gardeners as showing-
. . . deep respect for ancestors . a belief in the existence
of dieties who control the forces of nature [but who] are remote .
and uninterested in human affairs. Local spirits of limited power
and uncertain disposition are numerous and to be placated by small
offerings . . . and all the marginal groups are characterised by an
extreme development of the concept of taboo, so that the individual
is surrounded by innumberable supernaturally sanctioned regulations,
most of which have no recognized social significanec or ethical con-
notation
In the succeeding stage, the slash-and-burn cereal cultures, there
emerged a rather sharply warlike ethos--one which persisted in the high
valley irrigators--centered around head-hunting, ritual canibalism and
human sacrifice. These patterns all no doubt existed in the pre-iron age
root culture period as well. But, in the slash-and-burn stage, they came
to a kind of flourescence; with rank dependent upon war-making ability
bravery, and wealth; with well-organized and planned head-hunting parties
based on persistent feuds; and with the growth of a religious system in
which the notions of taboo and mana get focused on the shrunken heads of
the murdered or sacrificed victims, the heads then being seen as spiritual
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sources of fertility, personal power and good health. This militaristic
florescence was, evidently, in part stimulated by the increased compe-
tition for land within which to rotate fields implicit in the slash-
and-burn method of cultivation.
in the more sedentary r stage, when the status differences
established on a military basis in the slash-and-burn period began to
crystallize and become connected, also, to control over agricultural
surpluses,. ritual feasting, also an old pattern, grew more important
The feasts, which were seen as protective devices to ward off attacks
from the very populous spirit world, were graded in size and elaborateness
according to the status of the feast-giver within the community, the
ability to be generous naturally reflecting the traditional scale of
labor rights already discussed. The feasts thus played an economic,
political, and religious role all at once. Economically, they made
possible the efficient consumption of larger animals--goats, oxen, etc --
which, once killed, were difficult to store, and provided a. flexible
food distribution mechanism in a small group. Politically, they le-
gitimized and symbolized the individual's status and general prestige
(or lack of it), 9 0 as well as emphasizing, behind the differences in
power, the social solidarity of the ecological community. Religiously,
they assured a state of spiritual well-being, made for right relations
between the seen and the unseen worlds.
Again, we cannot be certain to what degree of complexity the
indigenous religious systems had come when hindui ation began. Both
the megalithic" remains of Eator Java and the complex cosnologies
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of Polynesia suggest that the wet-rice groups may have shown notable
advances in religious sophistication in pre-hindu times. But, in any
case, the coming of the Indian religions seems to have been closely
associated with the rise of supra-village political units: Hinduism
made kings out of chiefs, towns out of villages, and temples out of
spirit houses.92 It brought not merely a spiritual revolution, but a
political, aesthetic, and economic one as well. The transitiop from the
sort of self-contained politico-economic integration characteristic of
the traditionalistic bara to the type of fragile despotism which
marked the early kingdoms was, as we have seen, one of the most important
social changes in all of Javanese history, for it represented the rise
of civilization on the island. And it was this transition which Hinduism
first projected, then legitimized and finally, at least to a degree,
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stabilized.
In the b authority--the power to command labor--was dis-
tributed among members of the community according to fixed rules of
custom, in term of a religiously supported social order which was
regarded as having existed from time immemorial. Both leaders and
followers, high status people and low ones, were encased within this
sacralised cake of custom and the exercise of personal will, rational
decision,and even simple force was contained within the narrow limits
of the received ideas of social usage. Into such a context, Hinduism
seems to have come as a force liberating political leadership from the
bonds of tribal custom. It seems likely that the initial social effect
of the Indian religion was to free a few of the more successful leaders
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of petty linkd-barngay states from the traditional control over their
powers of decision; to broaden the effective range of their arbitrary
will and to extend the laboristic base of their power. The new creed,
whatever its spiritual attractions, not only permitted a wider scope
of political integration, but it provided the symbolic justification
for the formation of a socially segregated ruling elite above the
mass . "The Indian priesthood was called eastwards . . . for the magical,
sacral legitimation of dynastic interests and the domestication of
subjects and probably for the organization of the ruler 's territory
"94into a state.
Insofar as this sort of analysis ignores the spiritual element
and tends to give a view of religion as but a mask for material sot$ vce
it is inadequate, but the spiritual transformations within individuals
convertiag to Hinduism i* toort 6 fifth acftury Jav* are obtioubly
rather more difficult to reconstruct than the social results of such
conversions. The emerging supra-village elite, projected beyond the
world of the closed village society into a context where traditional
religious belief offered little guidance would, in any case, seem to be
logical candidates for a revised view of the nature of the divine-humn
encounter; and such people would be likely to find a religion consecrating
social status distinctions in terms of a diminishing flow of spiritual
power streaming from a divine king down through progressively less
exalted orders of society attractive. It was, in fact, the Hindu idea
of the divine king96 which was the religious innovation of central in-
portance in the liberation of political leadership from traditional
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constraints. For the notion that the ruler wma an incarnation of a
god (or, through mystical exercise, in continual contact with the divine)
lent to him that aura of being outside the realm of everyday secular
routine which Weber called charisma:
The term "charisma" will be applied to a certain quality of
as individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart
from ordinary men ad treated as endowed with supernatural,
superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers of
qualities. These are such as are not accessible to the ordinary
person, but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary,
and on the basis of then the individual concerned is treated as
a leader.97
fn traditionally stereotyped periods," Weber wrote, "Charisma is the
"98greatest revolutionary force. So, too, in Java. The chiefs who
would be kings claimed a divine mission in terms of Hindu cosmology,
declaring themselves free of the customary limitations on personal
power. They asserted their own political wills against the conserving
hand of a centuries old tribal tradition in terms of a dual reputation
for extraordinary military prowess and for divine inspiration, which
qualities were, in fact, mutual proofs of one another: the kings held
their followers to them by a guarantee (which was at the same time a
threat) of protection against rival depradators, the demonstration of
their ability to do so being regarded as the evidence of their divinity,
as a demonstration of their inability to do s4 was of its absence. The
anxieties over a loss of contact with the divine stimulated by the
abandonment of animistic village religious forms were absorbed into an
ecstatic mysticism which re-established that contact on a more direct,
if less secure, basis. And this more direct form of contact was reflected
in more absolute bras of political authority--the carefully detailed
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customary prescription of rights and duties of the barangay was abandoned
and replaced by an arbitrary personalistic determination of the limits
of hierarchical authority. Political ambition and spiritual ambition
were identified: sovereignty went to him whose contact with God was
most direct.
With this sociological view of the meaning of hinduisation for Java,
van Leur 'a argument that it was not Indian merchant-colonists but Brahman
priests, professional Indian soldiers and court artificers who mediated
the south asian civilization to Indonesia seems quite coercive.
9 9 The
early empty towns--if that indeed is what they were--muat, in their
purity of Indian style, have been the products of an almost wholly non-
Javanese group of sacerdotal specialists serving a multiplicity of petty
political leaders in a kind of priest-client relationship, hinduistic
consecration of mystico-political ambition being exchanged for material
support. - As the native political leaders grew strong enough to
maintain their own priests on a full-time basis, to bring capitol and
temple into a single social unit and fuse the military and religious
foundations of their power into a unified administrative staff, the
Javanuaation of the hindu aesthetic style proceeded steadily. By the
time of Madjapahit, when the castle-city state reached its mature form,
the official artistic style was as much (or more) Javanese as Indian.101
The Javanization of Hindu art, which has usually been interpreted as
the "reassertion of local genius" against an oppressive foreign influence
seems, in fact, to be a reflection 9f the increasing success of hindu-
ization ( in the more total sense of the word) rather than a breaking
loose from it. It reflects the progressive stabilization of religious
84
and political power within the ruling class, which comes to look more
like an independent bureaucracy than a personal staff to the king, and
the development of a genuine urbanism with true towns. This re-
traditionalising process-what Weber called the routinization of charisma--
proceeded only a certain distance however: the ecstatic, magical,
politically arbitrary element remained strong, leaving the states in-
trinsically fragile.
In any case, the now traditionalization was largely an urban
phenomenon; the village maintained the older form of social organization
(though there was such assimilation of reinterpreted hindu symbols into
that relatively unchanging structure). At the center of a loosely organized
congeries of small, scattered, semi-sedentary villages, there slowly
grow up a complex court culture in which mysticism, aestheticism and
militarism fused to form an aristocratic tradition which persists, to
a degree, in the Javanese upper classes of today. The king 's castle,
which, as te have seen, comprehended the entire town, became not only
an administrative center, a military base, but the symbolic reflection
of supernatural order. It was a squared-off "heavenly city," constructed
according to the ideas of hindu cosmology in which "harmony between the
empire and the universe is achieved by organizing the former as on image
of the latter, as a universe on a smaller scale ."0 The building of
the Hindu-Javanese capital as such a microcosm was in keeping with the
charismatic form of political integration: at the center was the divine
king, his throne symbolizing the holy mountain of Beru, seat of the gods;
and the buildings, roads, city walls and even, ceremonially, his wives
85
and personal staff, were deployed quadrangularly around him according
to the direction of the four sacred winds. Not just the king himself,
but his regalia and his castle were shot through with charisma. She
castle was the magical wellspring of the kingdom (in a sense, it was
the kingdom) and, as Heine--Geldern has pointed out he who--often after
meditating in the wilderness--captured the castle, captured the whole
empire, grasped the charisma of office, and displaced the no longer
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sacred king.
Thus, the negra-dea contrast was one not only of town vs. village,
or elite vs. mass, or soldier, priest and administrator vs. peasant,
but also one of the mystically accomplished vs. the spiritualiy unrefined
Within the a spiritual excellence was correlated with political
eminence. Magical power, mystical understanding and governmental authority
flowed outward and downward from the king through the descending ranks
of his staff, draining out beyond them into the spiritually and politically
residual peasant mass. The circular "radio waves" of power spreading
out away from the city capital, in terms of which the sovereignty of the
aristocracy was asserted against the distribution of politico nomic
rights solidified in village tradition, were religious as well as
military. The inherent instability of this situation has already
been stressed: the absence of a rural gentry, on the one hand, an/or
of a genuinely independent, self-contained literate buracacy, on the
other, meant that the culturally transforming process involved in Miafism
was only partial and the pre-colonial negara and desa remained, to a
certain extent at any rate, in different worlds.
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When the castle moved into the bazaar it found an even less receptive
medium through which to transmit its waves of charismatic power; the
cosmopolitan, mereantile, restlessly individualistic atmosphere of the
north coast g!e was not very conducive to magico-military government
In the first place, by the sixteenth century only a minority of the
'foreign traders were Hindus and Buddhists--most were Moslems from the
Middle East or Northwest India or were Chinese--and so claims to sover-
eignty in terms of Indian cosmology had little meaning for them.
Secondly, the military ingredient of authority was not as much sea
power as land power, and the land-based Javanese kings and princes
ould not hope to control the seas against people who had been maritime
for the whole of the Christian era: they had to bargain agrarian wealth
(rice) and land power (military control of harbors) against maritime
wealth (trade goods) and sea power (military control of the trade
lanes).105 Further, the high degree of geographic mobility on the
part of the traders tended to make their tie to any one harbor king
but temporary and, hence, superficial, while the semi-extraterritorial
nature of the various ethnic neighborhoods meant that any simple political
community did not exist. For a political integration you need a moral
consensus and in the pre-Islamic bazaar states ethic agreement, insofar
as it existed at all, tended to be limited to the rules of the economic
game.
The Javanese rice lords who would be merchant princes were, thus,
in a peculiarly difficult situation. Looking inland, they needed to
maintain their power of charismatic attraction to keep control over
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rice surpluses; but, at the sam times, they were struggling to break
loose from WMdjapehit domination. Looking outward, they wanted to gain
some sort of hold over the polyglot citizenry in the bazaar cities for
whom their claims to divinity had only an ethnological significance and,
later, they wished to strengthen Indonesian solidarity in the fweo of
Europein intrusion. Thus, when the West Indonesian alays began to go
Islamic and, following them, some of Javanese traders, the Javanese
princes were able to effect an at least partial and temporary solution
of all four of these problems by themselves converting. The a4option
of the creed of MuhaA gave them a conman religious tie with the
majority of the Asiatic traders (the Chinese, again, being the major
oxceptims), symbolized the solidarity of the "East" as against the
"West".(the first Europeans being mainly Portuguese, the earliest phases
of Western contact brought a Far Eastern re-enactment of the cross
and crescent struggle), expressed and legitimized their rejection of
Iadjapahit political claims, and, by carrying over divine king theories
more or less unchanged into the Islamic idiom, it enabled them to maintain
their hold over the peasantry. Prom the point of view of the Javanese
gentry, conversion to Islam was a handy solution to a complex of political
problems. Or, if not an actual solution, a projection of such a solution;
a symbolic statement of a new form of indigenous political integration
which could contain g , desa, and within one single whole.
But the conversion of the Javanese gentry was a following consequence,
not a motivating cause, of Islamization in Java. It was the mipgant
traders, rather than the agrarian princes for whom Islam came as a
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genuinely revolutionary form of religious orientation. For the gentry,
the marxist view of religious conversion as a mask for politioowooomio
motives seems appropriate enough. Gentry religious orientations did
not really change: he who had been hindu king was now moslem sultan;
but the correlation of mystical accomplishment and political status
remained unimpaired, and neither the egalitarian, the scholastic nor
the puritain implications of Islamic doctrine had much effect on it.
For the traders and sailors, however, Islam played a role similar to
that Hinduism had played earlier, but in a new context . As Hinduisa
had served to liberate petty local chiefs from traditional bonds so
they could appeal to a wider audience than their own self-contained
agricultural group, so Islam, borrowed from the Gujerati and Arab traders,
served to set free the mAritime cultures of Indonesia (the most prominent
being the West Indonesian Ialays rather than the Javanese) from their
local habitats and make them "international.0"
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Despite van Leur 's arguments to the contrary, the expansion
of trade in the archipelago did bring a radical change in Indonesian
social structure. Where the relatively small flow of trade previous
to.the fifteenth century was, for the most part, either wholly foreign
(much of it bypassing all except Western Indonesia entirely) or wholly
local, the enormously enlarged flow of trade subsequent to the appearance
of the age of exploration in Europe not only brought many more foreign
traders into Indonesian coastal towns for increasing lengths of time,
but brought the whole of the Indonesian maritime culture--till then
largely confined to fishing and local trade or piracy-into the worldwide
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mercantile economy. The international commercial expansion led to a
complementary Indonesian expansion, Malay language and culture spreading
throughout the islands, costing each coastline with a new way of life.
This growth of a genuine Indonesian trading culture modeled on inter-
national lines was at first contained within the hierarchic hinduistic
framework by the military domination of Madjapahit; but In time it could
no longer be so contained. The period of the bazaar states saw an ex-
pansion of trade coupled with a fragmentation of political power; a
re-creation, in a sense, of the urban conditions withia which Islam
had first arigen and taken hold:
It is significant :for the Mtslims' outlook on
their conumity that the shouldering of c4rtain edu-
eational and .ultural obligations is not:onsidered4
a primary requirement of the body politic. The aecece
of the government house from the list of the indispensable
characteristics of a town would suggest at first blush
that the Muslim town is perhaps not to be understoodas
a body politic at all. In any ewent, it is not (what
the polis was) an autonomous association of citizens
[The Moslem town] constituted not a closed corporation,
a sare in which defines the citizen, but merely a
functionally unified,, administrative entity with a
mee or logstable 10gmet of qettlews 1orinhitasts
The ancient political interest in the commamitys
the classical ideals of city-oneness and of the clarity
of architectural (and administrative) design have been
replaeed by a dominant religious interest, by ideal of
quarter or group loyalty, by the desire to shield the
family group from dispersal and contamination and by
the concept of government as an outside agency with which
one no longer identifies but whioh one rather wishes to
keep at arm's le from the spheres of one's personal
and familiar life. 08
The full-fledge Moslem town amha- himself was born in "the
most highly developed urban community in contemporary Arabia" and
"the appeal of his message was in large measure due to its appropriateness
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to the urban situation 109), Von Grunebaun points out, has two focal
points: the mosque and the market. No stresses what I have called
the "mosai" aspect of the integration of such a town:
In its business district (and in a sense in its "official"
section-mosque and government buildings-as well) the unity
of the town is apparent; the arrangement of the residential
districts reflects the separatist tendencies at work within
it. For the unity of the Muslin town is functional, not
civic. In their newly founde cities the Arabs would settle
by tribes, each tribal quarter to be coplete with its own
nosque, both, and as a rule its own market. In Baghdad
Persians and Arabs lived apart from the beginning, in Sanarra
buqtasin saw to it that the natives of Perghana and the
Turks occupied separate quarters without direct contact with
the Arab population, in Tiemcen the tension between the
"autochthonous" Hadri and the descen ants of the Turkish
janissaries the Qulughli, has remained alive to this very
day. Not infrequently, the individual quarters are walled
and their gates looked during the night to counteract the
insecurity of the tomn which is, after all, due in large
measure to the perennial interquarter animosities .
The loyalty of the townsman belongs to his family group and
after this to the ethnic or denominational unit which shares
his quarter. The tolerated minorities oocupy their om sections
of the town, with the Jews, for better protection, frequently
living in the immediate vicinity of the goeant area.
The occupants of the several quarters will meet typically
but in market and mosque . 1.
To this sort of social context, whether in the Middle-last, in
India or Indonesia, Islan, with its simple ritualisa, its lawyer-teacher
centered legalism and its strong cmmunal emphasis is particularly well
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adapted. Mosque and (pre-capitalist) market are a natural pair in the
sense that the far-flung, small-bulk speculative commerce the second
implies creates the kind of social experience (and the kind of social
man) to which the teaching of the first seem especially relevant and the
social forms in which those teachings are cast especially well designed.
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The spiritual equality of all men in the face of the absolute majesty of
God, the common community of all who live under His explicitly revealed,
humanly unquestioned and utterly comprehensive laws, and the ethical
universalism in terms of which true believers are obligated to treat one
another would seem more congenial view of the relation between this
world and the next for peripetetic peddler buyihg and selling in many
markets, among many sorts of people, under all kinds of political order;
much more congenial than a theory holding a particular local administrative
bureaucracy to be a spiritually graded hierarchy culminating in a fusion
of the divine and human at its apex. For Hinduism's attempt to sacralize
a political community built around inequalities in military power, Islam
substituted an attempt to sacralize a commercial community, built around
commonalities in economic motivation.
The sociological center of the Islamic idea lies in its conception
of unma Huhammadiyyah-Huhammad's community. Defined by a common ad-
herence to Koran, Hadit4 and Law (the symbolic affirmation of which i
the Confession of Faith: "There is no God but God and Muhammad is his
Prophet"), the uina is neither a mystical nor a territorial commity,
but a ritual-legal one:
So it became the task of the community to evolve a
comprehensive pattern for a life under God, covering
every phase of human existence from conception to
burial and eliminating any distinction between the
sacred and the profane aspects of life by making
every instant of it religiously relevant and requiring
ritualistic perfection for the performance of any
action whatsoever. In this manner behavior was stereo-
typed to a point, but the whole of life, down to its
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most repulsive detail, was given the supreme dignity of
religious significance . it is the quest for the
correct life that stands out as the supreme motive of
the Islamic experiment; it is the conflict between this
life and the exigencies of this world (frequently per-
sonified to the pious as lawless rulers, hypocrites
and hereti ) that largely dominates the internal history
of Islam.
In the bazaar states of northern Java, as in many of the other
cities along the great oriental trade route, this hind of community came
finally to dominate, although just at the point at which its victory
over the Hindu conception of social organization seemed assured European
incursion broke its growth. Religiously centered around the koranic
scholar, who as both lawyer and teacher was responsible for its orthodoxy
In the absence of any ecclesiastical hierarchy or churchly organi zation
whatsoever, it tied together Gujerati, Arab, Malay, Bugia, and Macassakese
Into a common ritual community independent of national origin--"such is
the atmosphere within which the muslim lives, a citizen of the uma
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bademadiyyah but a mere resident of his town It was, in fact,
the tension between the inherited customary law of the separate national
groups and the international, universalistic Islamic law-between adat
and hukua--Which Ws, as it has been everywhere in the Islamic world,
the chief ideologically dynamic factor of the culture.
The locus of the impulse to Islamization lay then, not in the agrarian
aristocracies, but in the merging trading class which it served to liberate
from local maritime traditions. The gentry changed its religious orientatibns
little if at all; their conversion vas a matter of political prudence.
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It was a desperate attempt to hold both pasar and desa to their leadership,
to project a new social and political unification under their domination.
Whether, had not the Dutch come, they would have succeeded eventually
is unclear. They would have had to continue the development toward a
literate bureaucracy, of a sort similar to China's, develop some sort
of a rural gentry, and yet to have maintained enough flexibility to contain
an expanding trade economy--not an easy task. In any case, the Dutch did
come, the north coast states were crushed and the three religious traditions
associated with desa, Bjrand pasa persisted only loosely related
to one another, though coming into more and more intimate contact as the
economic involution of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries drove town
and country closer together.
Through all the changes just described village religious patterns
were never fundamentally transformed. When their kings became hindu, the
peasants became, nominally, hindu; when. their kings became moslem, they--
even more nominally--became moslem. Many of the symbols, ritual patterne
and beliefs of the two imported traditions seeped down to the villages
(as some village traditions "seeped up" to the towns) and did, indeed,
alter both the phraseology and the particular quality of the rural re-
ligious system. But, essentially, the pre-hindu structure remained
intact, solidifying and intensifying as village life in itself solidified
and intensified. Rural religious beliefs continued to be ocerned
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with the symbolization both of the inherent mutual depedence among
"legally" independent family groups living in the same wet-rico growing
community and with gradations of, first labor, then land-and-labor based
differences in political status.
The ritual feast, Whose food is offered both to the spirits and to
one 's neighbors, remains the religious center of village life to this
day, petitions to hindu gods and goddesses and moslen koranic chants
having bees added to its animiustic core for style. The feasts are clustered
around points of passage in the human life cycle, around seasonal re-
currences in the yearly round and around residential integrations (the
neighborhood, the village as a whole): they form a sort of universal
social joint, fitting the various aspects of social life and individual
experience together in a way which minimizes uncertainty, tension, and
conflict. Such a feast is always held by one family, to which usually
eight or nine geographically contiguous families (represented by their
male heads) are invited. The women of the host household cook the food,
which is served in individual bamboo-leaf dishes. The male head of the
household sits with his guests in a circle in his "living room," there
is a burning of incense for the spirits, a formal announcement by the
host of his reasns- for giving the feast and a koranic chant. Each of
the guests then hurriedly consumes a few handfuls of food, begs to be
ezoused, and returns to his own household to share the sacralized food
with the remainder of his family. 1l4
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1e basic ritual unit of the village is, then, the household--a
ma, his wife and his children, sometimes another close relative such
as a sister, mother-in-law and so forth. The religious community in the
village is not a supra-familial one, not an organic, individual-swallowing
collectivist one in the narrow sense. Even in the one important village-
wide ritual the family is not dissolved into a superordinate mass.
The so-called "cleansing of the village" (of evil spirits) annual rite
is but little more than a simple compound of separate familial feasts.
Each family prepares a basket of food at home, the male head brings it
to the grave of the village founder, the ceremony is held, a little
of some other family's food is eaten by the male head, and then he carries
it home to share with his own family. There is no common kitchen, no
village-wide ritual organization to carry out the ceremony; only the food
of separate, self-contained, kitchens exchanged among geographically
conjoined families. The Javanese peasant, uho has so often been seen to
be a featureless cipher svallowed up in his social whole, actually holds
himself rather aloof from it, keeping his thoughts to himself and willing
to give others only what tradition assures him they are going to give,
in some form, back to him. This is a kind of "failistic individualism"--
as such patterns have been called elsewhere-the encounter between human
and divine is not one between individual worshiper, amid other individual
worshipers, and God(s), but between family(i.e., household), amidst other
families, and God(s), The households are like so many windowless mads,
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their harmony pro-ordained by a common adherence to a single, age-old,
tradition.
That this pattern reflects the social organization of village life
is apparent. Such a reciprocal feasting pattern is able to express
both the ultimate solidarity of all village members--sacramental commensality
is an almost worldwide religious rite of social comimion--and the dif-
ferentiation among the separate social units, in this case families. Food
has always been the chief form of consumable wealth in the Javanese village,
as in any peasant village, and, consequently, its distribution has tended
to be a direct symbol of differences in rights within the village labor-
land-authority pool. The entanglement of feasting patterns with labor-
exchange systems, with land-rights and with noblesse oblige political
patterns has meant that the involutional processes already traced in their
development has been reflected in a similar process in religious patterns.
although good descriptions of the details of Javanese village religious
life in the pro-modern period are laaking, it seems certain that from the
use of feasts as traditionalised "payments" for traditionally owed field
labor, to their use as expressions both of equality among core villagers
and of differences between core villagers and village leaders on the one
hand and "foreign" hangers-on on the other, to the present situation In
which the small gradations in status are subtly reflected in their incidence
size and personnel--through this whole developmental process these simple
little rituals have reflected the growth, maturity and ossification of
Javanese village life.
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As for the gentry, the negara element, the colonial period saw
a similar development, but in this case there was a tendency for the
tradition to split in two. As the pt culture crumbled under European
impact, Mataram turned in upon herself and produced a religious and
artistic remnaissance, an outburst of cultural creativity in which the
Hindu-Javanese arts (dance, shadow-play, textile design) and religious
practices (fasting, meditation, numerology), now in nominally Islamic
115guise, were brought to their highest point of perfection. It Was
"a byzantine epoch when the young Javanese court etiquette and the young
116Javanese court language attained their completion and polish." Great
epics relating Javanese dynastic history were composed, new dances were
created through the dramatization of traditional mythical themes, mystical
poems of great beauty were written in newly invented poetic forms--in
aesthetic terms the Mataram period is perhaps the high point in Javanese
history. The reduction of Nataram by the Dutch to a powerless museum
piece dampened the creative fervor but nevertheless served to accentuate
the emphasis on aesthetics and mysticism even further by severing political
concerns from court life. There developed a hot-house court culture which
labored to perpetuate the more hinduistic form of world-view among the
newly emerging bureaucracy, the members of which tended to look to the
Central Javanese nobility for cultural leadership.
But in the north coast areas, the situation was rather different.
Culture System and Liberal Period prosperity enabled the Dutch--who by
now had become aware of the unhealthful effects of sluggish canals,
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narrow streets and small windows in the tropics--to nove out into spacious
suburbs on the edge of town (though their expanding commercial enterprises--
banks, plantation companies, shipping concerns, factories-remained centered
117in a financial section of the city). Once there, they developed a
kind of culture which, as it was a mixture of Dutch bourgeois and Javanese
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gentry patterns, Wertheim has called nestizo. It was a manorial style
of life, complete with country house, extensive "rice-table" banquets and
great staffs of servants. Though the Dutch were its most accomplished
practioners, the wbole of the social elite in the port cities-which
included rich native-born Chinese, the higher ranking of the Indo-European
mixed-race group and the top layers of the native civil service--follod
it also, as best they ware able. Thus, there arose, within the gentry,
a group of Dutch educated, Dutch speaking, Dutch imitating "Oultural
middlemen" mediating foreign patterns to their countrymen; something of
a contrast to the group of inland court-oity nobles, caretakera and connois-
seurs of the old Javanese (nee, hindu) traditions, who tended to be
soeptical, at best, of the advantages of European culture.
Thus, to an extent, the old cultural homogeneity of the gentry was
lost. On the one hand there were what Robert Redfield, following Toynbee,
has called the intelligentsia, that group of people who have learned
cultural patterns alien to their coammity, who "have learnt the tricks
of the intrusive civilization's trade so far as may be necessary to enable
their ow community, through their agency, just to hold its own in a
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social environment in fhich life is ceasing to be lived in accordance
with local tradition and is coming more and more to be lived in the
style imposed by the intrusive civilization upon the aliens iho fall
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under its dominion." On the other hand, there were what Redfield
calls the literati, those persons enclosed within a culture mwioh has become
a civilization and "who carry It forward into a more systematic and
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reflective phase. " The distinction is far from absolute; most gentry
had--and have-something of each aspect in their makeup.
Finally, we turn to the recent history of the more Islamic
culture. As the Javanese-traders turned inland to become itinerant
back-country peddlers, following the decline of native controlled interna-
tional trade in north Java, they extended their somewhat more vigorous
Islam, not only to the small secondary and tertiary toms where pruistic
moslem quarters soon grew up around the mosques, but, ultimately, to
certain village elements as well. Richer peasants, small handicraft
factory owners and the emerging village trading class, particularly,
121found themselves attracted to a somewat more moslem view of things.
The Islam of these groups was rather impure from sn orthodox point of
view; merely the usual feast-centered rural religious systems under a
fairly transparent moslem veil. But, in time, the rural became
something of a distinctive group, aligned with the urban traders in their
common emphasis on the superiority of the Islamic religion, opposed to
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them in their more syncretic view of what the content of that religion
actually was.
The institutional nucleus of this rural Islamic group was not so
such the mosque as the boranic sehool. Such schools wero constructed
on a modified monastic pattern The students--young bachelors, anywhere
from ten to thirty years old-lived in dormitories, cooked their ow
food and, usually, worked in the fields of the koranic teacher (or
some other well-to-do supporter of the school) as much as half of their
time; sometimes even small handicraft industries--textile dyeing, garment
making--esre attached to the schools, in which the students would work.
The method of "study" was very ritualistic and formalistic; it consisted
mostly of the "teacher" chanting and the pupils "echoing" arabic texts
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neither could understand. As for the teacher, he was commonly a
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i .e., a man who had made the pilgrimmage to Mecca; and so was not
only rather extraordinary from a religious point of view, a sojourn In
the holy city making one a scholar automatically in the eyes to the
villager, but usually at least somewhat well-off economically. Around
the koranic school, then, uianmad 's rural Javanese community developed,
its contact with the urban community growing more intimate as time passed,
population grew and secondary and tertiary Javanese towns become more
numerous .
Thus, as this century began, there were apparent on the Javanese
scene three main religious traditions-one having its major social referent
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in Javanese village life, one in the urban aristocracy turned bureaucracy,
and the third in the commercial trading group. But, despite my didactic
segregation of these traditions from one another for the purposes of exposition,
they have never been wholly isolated from one another, but rather have
formed part-elements within the sort of cultural tradition Redfie d has
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called compound: one in which, though the part-elements maintain the
major outlines of their own identity, they participate in a broader
125
pattern of cultural process in terms of which they interact with one anotber
Elsewere, I have compared the gentry and peasant traditions to etched
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mirrors, each dimly catching a distorted reflection of the other,
and one may add the trader tradition as a third, complicating, mirror.
This house of mirrors image seems appropriate: village religious patterns
have syncretised Islam and Hinduism into their shbtiginal animistic
outline; gentry religion leaves space for spirit beliefs and time for
Moslem ritual; and the Islam, even of the pious urban traders, does not
prevent a belief in native curing techniques or impose a rejection of the
values of mystical contemplation. Behind the three traditins lies a
common, dimly sensed, consensus, as behind the separate social sub-systems
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lies a broader, total social system. No more than the fact that America
is largely divisible into Protestant*s, Catholics, and Jews, does the
trichotomous patterning of religion in Java imply an underlying social
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or ideological disunity.
Nevertheless, the three religious variants have remained, in part,
distinct from one another: none of them has absorbed any of the others
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to any great extent; none of then has become noticeably dominant over
the rest; nor have they dissolved into a comeon belief, despite the
growing strength of nationalism as such a solvent ideology. The
involution of Javanese social structure under the insact of population
growth, Dutch intrusion, and agricultural intensification has, however,
brought then into increasingly direct confrontation, particularly in
the towns, where, not so closely indentified with their social contexts
as they once were (there are now pious moslem civil servants whose
fathers were traders, prosperous businessmen who have not lost the
aristocratic world-view of their civil-servant fathers, petty traders
who maintain an essentially village outlook on life, etc.), they show
signs both of internal reformation and of a working out of new forms
of relation to one another, perhaps even of a shifting of the social
bases on which they rest. The peasants come to town atteMt to adjust
the village religious pattern to urban conditions; the small Javanese
traders and businessmen intensify their Islamic self-consimousne;
and the civil-servants, teachers, and white-collar workers atteot
to combine literati and intelligensia patterns into a new elite way
of life.
The thrusting of these three kinds of people into a common urban
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melting pot has tended to increase the individual Javanese 'a sense
of differentiation between social context and religious conittment.
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one can no longer assume a person 's world-outlook to be an autmatic
deduction from his social position. And, as this distinction comns
Clear, the term which the Javanese use to indicate the three socio-
cultural variants which we have been describing-ag, for the village
pattern; prijai, for the elite pattern, and santri for the purist
moslem pattern--come to have a more explicitly ideological, less
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social-structural significance. But at the same time, the attempt
to restate these religious value-systems becomes an attempt to restate
the wh6le social form of the society.
The restatements so far have been--like the changes in economic
and political aspects of Javanese society already discussed-but
tentative at best. For the santris, the rise of Islamic reformism
in the first and second decades of the century within the urban trading
group represents such an attempted restatement; but its future remains
in doubt, the energies of its protagonists having for the past two
decades been almobt wholly absorbed in practical day-to-day political
problems, as have those of almost all Indonesian intellectuals. In
some of the prijai dominated political parte- lwth before and
after the Revolution--there has appeared something of an attemt to
reconcile the intelligensia and literati patterns with one anoe-
to mahe Bast meet West--and the growth of socially-comsocous mystic
sects In the towns may prove of some significance in this regard.
ngan flirtation with marxism evinces similar, perhaps more ominous
strirrings. But one can hardly predict the outcome. All that is
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certain is that as they have in the post, these various religious
patteras focus around the crucial contrasts and cnmnomaities within
Javanese society, reflect both the unalterable events of Java's
history and the at least partially pliable possibilities of her
uoertaia future.
0
VI, Conclusion
Economic development within any society rests, in the first
instance, on the quantity and quality of the factors of production--
land labor, capital, and organization--available to the society and
on the growth of flexible markets in each of these factors by means
of which they can be shifted efficiently among specific economic
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employments . The extent and excellence of a nation 's resources,
the size and skill of its labor force, the scope and complexity of
its productive "plant," and the distribution and value of entreprenurial
abilities among its population are only one element in the assessment
of its capacity for economic growth; the institutional arrangements
by means of which these vrious factors can be brought to bear on
any particularly economic gbsl is another. Tbe barriers--to put the
problem the other way round-to economic growth in such a region as
Java is not merely the severe shortage of certain resources (e .g.,
cultivable land), the lack of industrial disciplines among her popu-
lation, the primitiveness of her capital equipment or the poverty of
her people 's economic imagination; but the rigidity with which such
resources, skills, equipment, and creativity that she does possess
are locked into a fixed, stereotyped, pattern of employment It is
for this reason that economic development in "underdeveloped" areas
implies such more than capital transfers, technical aid, and ideological
exhortation: it demands a deep going transformation of the basic
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structure of society and, beyond that, perhaps even in the underlying
value-systen in terms of which that structure operates,
The extent to which such a transformation may prove difficult
has, I hope, been indicated in the foregoing analysis. The overdriving,
not just of the economy but, in a sense, the whole society in Java
by the events of the past one hundred years suggests how deeply involved
in broadly social and cultural factors any proposal for economic change
in Indonesia must inevitably become and how resistent such factors
are likely to be to such proposals. In Java, "modern capitalism,"
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in Weber's sense of that term, has come, and is coming, not as a
slowly evolving, indigenously produced innovation, contained, regulated,
and supported by the gradually transforming social and cultural forns
within which it arose, but as a diffused pattern from economies in-
finitely more advanced that her own and without the socio-cultural
context within which it is set in those economies. The contact with
this pattern and with these economies, mediated as it has been in
terms of such a special political form, has led not to an increasing
relaxation of traditional constraints, a "rationalisation" of social
forms, but to an intensification of them. It is an unhappy fact that
Javanese society was probably in many ways more open to structural
change in the first decades of the nineteenth century, more ready to
permit the kind of (relatively) tradition-free operation of narrowly
econoici e tws, aaw l viuLvattions characteristic of the
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West, than It is now, when cultural conservatism, and overblown
population have become so mutually supportive of one another. But
economic history does not run backwards any more than does history
generally, so that a society which has missed favorable cpprtua ties
for change in the past cannot go back and try again: Java will have
to make the transition to an industrial economy, if she makes it at
all, with all the disabling rigidities she has inherited from a
century-long delay in agricultural, political, urban, and even
religious reform.
All this is not mere pessimism, although there is clearly a good
deal in the Javanese case about which one may rightly be pessimistic.
Rathr; it is an attempt to point an academic moral, a moral perhaps
most neatly stated in Bergson 's aphorism that there is nothing in
the present but the past. This is an historian's exaggeration;
but it is true that a completely synchronic view of society, culture,
and economy leaves one at, the mercy of accidents which have already
happened. Gross , quantitative, aggregative approaches to the problem
of economic development in underdeveloped countries, cast in a wholly
contemporary dimension and carried on in the absenee of a conete
understanding of history, culture, and social structure, are likely
to be only misleading. It will not do to speak airily of "concealed
unemployment" unless one is more specific about just where it is
concealed--in town, city, or countryside, in which classes, in what
sort of occupational, political, and religious groups--and how it
108
cam to be concealed there. Discussions of capital transfers man little
in the absence of some sort of discussion of through what kind of am the
transfer is to be mediated, what sort of institutions might regulate its
distribution, what sort of cultural traditions determine its made of employ-
mist; and these are all partially historical questions.
Historical and scientific analysis form a double perspective in terms
of which it is possible to give social facts a semblance of three-dimensional
reality absent in a merely chronological or merely theoretical approach.
Panofsky, the art historian, seems to as as a matter of fact, to have
portrayed the relation between the historian and the scientist with almost
perfect clarity:
When we call the conoisseur a laconic art historian and the
art historian a loquacious connoisseur, the relation between
the art historian and the art theorist my be compared to that
between two neighbors who have the right of shooting over the
same district , while one of then owns the gun and the other
all the amounition. Both parties would be well advised if
they realised this cAdition of their partnership. It has been
rightly said that theory, if not received at the door of an
empirical discipline, coms in through the chimney like a ghost
and upsets the furaiture. But it is no less true that history,
if not received at- the door of a theoretical discipline dealing
with the sams set of p--aomma, creeps into the cellar like a
horde of mice end undermines the grondwuork. 1 3 3
13TES
1. Java is, of course, but a region, perhaps the most important region,
within the national state of Indonesia. The limitatiom of this analysis
to fava meas that, from the point of view of an analysis of Indonesian
economic development, it demands supplementation in the form of consider-
ation of the "outer islands"--Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes, and the Lesser
Bundas--and of Indonesia as a single unity.
2. In Indonesian scholarship the torn "hinduism" has traditionally been
employed to refer to all of the various Indian religious forms--Brahmanism,
Shivaism, Buddhisa-which diffused tp the archipela4o, as well as to
combinations of them, and it will be so employed h e.
3. The classic work on the hindu period is still Rrom, N. J., Hindoe-
Javaansche Geschiedenis, Den Haag, 1931, though som. of his theoretical
foraulations have been questioned. A shorter and move popular version
my be found in Stutterhein, W. F., Uet Hinduisme in Pen Archipel, Groningen,
Den Haag, and Batavia, 1932. A brief English description is given in
Vlehke, B. H. N., Nusantara, A History of the last Indian Archipelago,
Ca ridge (Massachusetts), 1945, from which the above dates are taken.
4. my of these towns existed prior to the age of exploration trade
expansion, for oriental trade was of some importance from the time of
Christ and hinduised seaport kingdoms, especially in Sumatra, were of
political importance during the period of the rise of agriculturally based
states on Java. See Coedes, G., Les Etata Hindouises D 'Indonohine et
D 'Indonesie, Paris, 1946 and Quaritch-Wales, . 0., The NMking of Greater
India A 9tud of Southeast Asian Culture Chng, London, 1951. For the
period of trade expansion, see van Leur, J. C, Indonesian Trade and Societyg
Essays in Asian Social and Eoononic Bastory, The Hague and Bandung, 1955,
and Schrieke, B. Indonesian Sociological Studies, T1*d Hague and Bandung, 1955.
5. For the period of the downfall of the Javanese states, see Rouffaer,
0. P., Vorstenlanden, Overdruk ult Adetrecht Bundel yXXIV, Serie D, No.
81, blz. 233-378, Leiden, 1931.
6. The best economic and political hbstory of the Colonial Period is
Furnivall, J. S., Netherlands India, Study of Plural Coo , ambridge
(England) and Now York, 1944. Other Analyses include Goggrijp, 0., Sohets
eener Economische Geschiedenis van Neerlandsch-Indie, Haarleb, 1928, and
Burger, H. D., De Ontaluiting van Jav8 's Binnenland voor het Wereldverkeer,
Wagesingen, 1939.
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7. One partial exception to this generalization was the stimalation of a
market for Dutch textiles which seems to have had an inhibiting effect on
native handicraft textile industry. See Werthein, W. T., Effects of Western
Civilization on Indonesian Society, Now York, 1950, p. 5.
8. For the "dual" econoq approach, see Booke, 3. 5., conomics .nd Economic
Poliy of Dual societies as ExeMlified by Indonesia, Now York, 1953.
For the "plural" analysis, Purnivall, op. ct.
9. For anm exale of how a retreat to a more heavily subsistencweaaented
oconaW led, during the 1929 depression, not to "natural readjustment" but
to declining welfare, social rigidification and increased rural indebted-
ness, see Van der Kolff , 0 H., The Ristorical Development of labor Relation-
ships in a Remote Corner of Java, New York, 1936.
10. At its greatest the Culture System only occupied 5 per cent of Java s
cultivable land. (Dobby, I. H. G., Southeast Asia, London, 1950, p. 238.)
But as this was, for the most part, the best land; and as the forced crop
system was not applied to the sam land every year) the impact of the systen
was mach greater than it would appear from this figure. In any case, it
is the labor element, which was then in short supply, not the land element
which is important; and the great majority of Java's population seen to
have been caught up, in one way or another, in the Culture System.
11. Actually, though the System is usually considered to have been formally
abolished in 1870, many of its practices persisted into this century, and
it was not until 1915 that a law was passed forbidding forced cultivations.
Furnivall, op. cit., p. 183.
12. Toward the end of the period population was increasing at a rate of
33 per cent a decade! (Dobby, op. cit ., p. 239.) The increase as a whole
was from six million in 1830 to nine and a half million in 1870. (Furnivalls
op. cit., p. 136.)
13. The development of industry in Holland akd the increased world denand
for industrtal raw materials at this period, shifted Dutch interests away
from consumption erops producing Javanese enog to the outer Indonesian
islands where the less developed state of the wet-rie* econo and a lower
population density permitted a more extensive pattern of rae material e-
ploitation. But the low population also meant that workers had to be drawn
from Java to staff the new concerns with unskilled labor. See Wertheim,
op. cit., p. 5.
14. The greater proportion of the serviceg retail and smaller wholesale
businesses were, of course, in the hands of the Chinese. After the combi-
nation of Dutch monopoly and Nataran's disdain for commierce crippled the
Javanese trading sector, the Cainese becane increasingly powerful. Under
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th qewas. C they vex aluved for a =cms atiem, to Ut holev11ages
ta mentempeaeia landlords.. Uader the Matme Systfaeita plis-
pae a, oiua, staghtwong, salt, e.-eae sees to hw by the
Stat*e had iA the Corporate PNastatiet , 9g E e the
tiwat ti1s to mw treely is ava t lateafes, Soft S"*sft
Em des3esag desti# twanb ebnt ndei0iM ieana gath
of a streng middle class. r devssiptiaS Of ct se tt,
see Cater, W. 41., aNOe ti ew the miae
N. I., the f*aee is Zaiesla, usapublsed umanscrpt aM th
Internati3al Studies, Dassahe--tts Institute of Teobaology.
is. Xor a fAL desaipties t the oise of mintean m lte~ sis. -ea
1nhb1, 0. at., Nainm ad Revolutiaa is niasgela Ithaca, 1966.
T The voluntaristic laguage of the mdel is also misleading. lt is aSc
of 4ur90, a s1l0 dhaage in the cmscimi intivatioa of the worbers vick
is involved, not, as sam (e.g., ehe, .) have argued, ot a besno
Sability of certain racial or cultural groups to think i .oeneuicay
aticOal terms, but , as ve shall see, an alteratieM is the Mtole form at
the caritural ad teohnologoal pattern of promnotion, of the socially-
structured process of produotiem.
16. ot the sequence of land-use patterns in Southeast Asia and a mti e
of their implication for social and ecanomn problems, see Pelser, K., R*o-
Neer Sttlmnt la the Asian Troies, Nw Tork, 1945. Dobbs, 4
lade* a sinLlar difssc . or a geMeral rdiossie of -the r20stics
betes types ft land-use and social form see Frde, C., 
and oet, Ionden md New york, 1934, especially Part IV.
19. Pelar, P vit., states that IS per Oent of the 1md I& US Rippine
IslmadAs s 1 wa a relt af shifting ulti te.
Me - author also reports a tk Gsovemmat study is Mauma mich
hed2 an as Was pulatie me w 30 per
square ale end hold that the *hifting ettivator with a stev-pWsoa family
seeded 2 1/2 aores a year atitfted annally is a ten year qpl. r a
daM=i=sic of the relations betwem climate, population density am sbittig
cultivation ia Baran thick Sebasines atie n wst ng of these factors,
see Lu4ch, .*., bi1tial Sptem of i auras, asridge (ssMabusetts),
1964, pp. 21f.
20. lor an excellmnt inam0le, see Provinse, 4., "Cooperative 1ioetteld
CUltivatica amag the SIamg Dyaks of Central Borseo," Americs Aathropologist,
Vol. 30, 193?.
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21. Van der Veer, K., De Rijstculture in Indonesie, sGravenhage, 1949.
For contemporary examples of this simpler highland form of irrigatioa,
se* Barton, R., Ifugao Economics, Berkeley, 1922 or Hutton, J. R., The
Angali Nagas .London, 1921. The idea that the sort of terracing one finds
among the Ifugao and Angami implies an immediate social revolation and
demands large scale organization and complexity of political development
is an error, as the cultural similarities between these groups demmstrates
(see Leach, op. cit., p. 27). It is complexity of work task, not mere
quantity of it which is the crucial variable in this connection, and the
building of dramatic terraces such as those of the Ifugao, while they may
take such time and labor are actually not so very much more demanding
technically than the slash-and-burn regime. Such forms of irrigation,
which demand only simple spillways and terraces, may be built up slowly,
piece by piece, over the course of centuries. It is only in the lowland
basins, where problems of flooding, draining, transport of water over
extended distances of level land and wide seasonal variations in water
supply are nt, that the need for highly complex social organization is
felt. Wet rice agriculture should be seen to develop smoothly through
increasing levels of complexity and intensification as any other sort of
cultivation, not to be inevitably an advanced system.
22. Op. cit., p. 38.
23. It might seem that innovations such as iron and oz-pulled ploughs would
be labor-saving. Taken in isolation--in that a ma can cut down a given
number of trees faster with an iron ax than with a stone one--they are.
But seen as but parts of a change in the whole manner of exploiting the
land they are not. Iron stimulated an agricultural regine--slash-and-
burn--which demanded more not less labor than the neolithic horticulture
it replaced and along with the ox and plough came such more labor-demanding
techniques as complicated terracing, transplanting, more careful weeding
and so forth. Of course, certain innovations may have reduced labor demands
for short periods, but when the curve is smoothed, the direction is clear:
it is toward higher typical nutritional densities, not lower ones. Agri-
cultural innovations, as industrial ones, must be seen not as isolated
changes but as elements within an evolving productive pattern.
24. The concept of "Involution" is fron Goldenweiser, A., "Loose Ends of
Theory on the Individual Pattern and Involution in Primitive Society," in
Lowie, R. H., ed., Essays in Anthropology Presentedto A.L. roeber, Berkeley,
1936. "The application of the pattern concept to a cultural feature in the
process of development provides, I think, a way of explaining one peculiarity
of primitive cultures. The primary effect of.pattern is, of course, to
check development, or at least to limit it. As soon as the pattern form is
reached further change is* inhibited by the tenacity of the pattern. . . .
But there are also instances where pattern merely sets a limit, a frame,
as it were, within which further change is permitted if not invited. Take,
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for instance, the decorative art of the Maori, distinguished by its complexity,
elaborateness and the extent to which the entire decorated object is pervaded
by the decoration. On analysis the unit elements of the design are found
to be few in number; in some instances, in fact, the complex design is
brought about through a multiplicity of spatial arrangements of one and the
sam unit . What we have here is a pattern plus continued development.
The pattern precludes the use of another unit or units, but it is not
inimical to play with the unit or units. The inevitable result is pro-
gressive complication, variety within uniformity, virtuosity within monotony.
This is involution. A parallel instance . . . is provided by what is called
ornateness in art, as in the late Gothic. The basic forms of art have
reached finality, the structural features are fixed beod variation, in-
ventive originality is exhausted . Still, development goes on. Being
heed in an all sides by a crystallized pattern, it takes the function
of elaboratins. Expansive creativeness having dried up at the saurce, a
special kind of virtuosity takes its place, a sort of technical hairsplitting.
. Any one familiar with primitive cultur*a will think of similar instances
ia other cultural doamins." The phenomenon is not limited to primitive
cultures however, as Goldenweiser himself insisted, and it is not always
due to a simple loss of creativity on the part of the pattern beiarers,
but =,&a lack of opportunities for change, for an expression of creativity
which exists.
25. But it remains the dominant form of land use in the outer islands of
Indonesia where the lack of the kind of volcanic replenishment of the poor
tropical soil one finds on Java makes wet-rice growing uneconomic in most
areas .
26. Jay, Robert, in forthcoming study on village life* has described this
process in detail for a small area in east-central Java where it occurred
sosbat later than it did in central Java proper.
27. g ven corcial agriculture did net, for the most part, lead to the
use of less labor in the subsistene econony, for it interpenetrated mad
interlocked with the subsistence pattern so neatly, either through planting
cash crops on native land (first as a forced-labor tax, later in a cm-
pulsory, or semi-compulsory, reanting system), or through hiring day workers
from the immediate area around the plantation en a tempeary piece-work
basis. As a result, the creation of a gemuine agrieutural proletariat
was minimized. Comircial agriculture merely absorbed labor as it was
temorarily not needed in the peasant economy and so did not drain it
away from the conatryside, but, rather, stimAlated rural population growth.
28. See Jay, o. cit., for som examples.
*This will be u volume in Modjokuto: A Study of Townand Village Life in
Modern Java, Center for International Studies, MIT, 1956.
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29. For the high peasant valuation on cash, see ibid. Mariations in
farming success often seem to rest on variations in access to money, by
means of which the farmer can take advantage of the few fleaibilites
still remining in the system.
30. Ia nop-maoetised share-crop or cooperative labor patterns, of course,
the organization of production and distribution are regulated by a single
structure.
31. Some examples of the operation of such values include the obligation
of a man with a relatively large amount of land not to work all of it
himself, even it able to do so, not to work it entirely with wage labor;
but to allor kin, political dependents or poorer neighbors a chance to
share in its cultivation. Contrariwise, such a na is speeted to permit
others to use his labor on their fields, even though he has no personal
economic reason to so offer it. The "fair sharea" idea means that even
the most moderate form of "Taglorisn" in the direction of agricultural
labor is very difficult of accomplishment; even in the most highly moane-
timed areas, for example, meals are still provided workers . The reluctance
to alienate land to outsiders (it is forbidden by law to alienate it to
foreigners) teds, of course, to prevent the development of large land-
holdings .
32. It is sometimes argued that if the m=rginal productivity of labor
Is near zero, that implies labor may be withdrawn from a prdductive process
without a fall in output. This does not necessarily follew. If a unit of
labor is added to a productive process without adding anything to proAeftion--
put there simply because there is nothing else to do with it sad its comer
must subsist--it is possible that the process may nevertheless alter its
structure, after a period, in order to assimilate this "rAenundat" labor
that a withdrawal of it again will now cause a fall in output, at least
until the system re-adapts, which my be quite ahile if the process is
more used" to expending than contracting its labor -element. Again, the ad-
diction metaphor seems appropriate: the margipal increase in pleasure
from increasing your already large dose of heroin my be almost infinitesi-
mal and in any case transitory, but the decrease in pleasure which will
result, after a fairly short time, from taking this increment away again
my be overwhelming.
33. For an excellent discussion of two such contrasting cases see Furnivall,
J. S.,I Colonal2 Pbliy Ad Pactice, A ompaWtive Study of Surm and
Netherlands India, Caridge (England), 1948.
34. See the discussion of the relation between the rationalization of
land taxation, commercialisation of agriculture and politically directed
economic development in Meiji Japan in Buchanan, N. and gl1s, R.,
Approaches to oonomic Development, Now York, 1955, pp. 175ff. 5
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35. Jay, op. cit.
36. iUnton, R., The Tree of Culture, Now York, 1955, p. 174
37. For a good description of such a system see, Rose, C. and ND)ougall,
W., The Pagan Tribes of Borneo, London, 1912.
38. Again, the process was a gradual, not a sudden one . The simpler
highland irrigators often show very weak political leadership. See Barton,
R., Ifugao Law, Berkeley, 1919.
39. For the barangay see Kroeber, A . L. ,aPeople f the Philiggine,
New York, 1928. Reconstructions of political forms in the prehis7:rical
period are, of course, necessarily hypothetical, and the postulatios of
a b type of pattern as the ancestor of the Javanese village is but
an informed surnise. Today, there appear to be, in general, two min
types of social organization in Indonesia whose relation to co another
is obscure. Unilineal systems, coinmanly with ranked lineages in terms
of the so-called assymetrical connubium (i .e., one-sided cross-cousin
marriage), are found in Sumtra and East Indonesia; bilateral systems,
of the sort here described, also sometimes with ranked lineages, but of
the "a ilateral" sort, are found in Borneo, Java, and parts of East
Indonesia (as well as in all of the Philippines and most of Malaya).
Thus, the postulation of a bilateral group for Java, which, despite the
claims of some Dutch scholars, shows no traces of unilineal organization
today, seems reasonable, if more or less unprovable. For a thorough
review of the whole distribution of forms of social organization in
Indonesia, see Ter Haar, B., Adat law in Indonesia, New York, 1948.
40. For bilateral kin groups (called "ambilineages," "ambilateral lineages
or "non-unilineal descent groups"), in the Oceania-Indonesiaw culture area
see Goodenough, W., "alayo-P6lynesian Social Organization," Americs
A MEofLogist, 0Vol. 57, 1955 and Leach, . R ., "Some Features of Social
Organization among Sarawak Pagans," Ma, London, Vol. 48, 1946. For a
contemporary Indonesian system which seems to bear some similarities to
the b y sort of social organization, see Chabot ,., Vervantsohap,
Stand en Same in Muid Celebes, Groningen, 1950.
41. The chronological sequence of temple sites seems to follow the hill
to valley wet rice progression rather closely. The earliest finds are the
temples of the Dieng Plateau, a high mountain valley in dead central Java,
dated about 750M. Next, from about 800 to 900, come the great Buddhist
temple of Barabudur and, after it, the Shivaist Pamann group, both in
the Progo river area near Jogjakarta. This is followed in the East by a
progression down the Brantas river towards the sea, with Singhasari,
Kadiri, and adjapshit following each other both in time and in advancement
towards the coast. See Vlekke, .
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42. "It required the sity to bring [the peasant] into existence. And
those surviving primitive peoples who do not live in terms of the city
are not peasants. . . The peasant is a rural native whose long established
order of Uift takes important account of the city ." edfieLd, R., The
Primitive World and Its Transformations, Ithaca, 1953, p. 31.
43. In Hx Weber 's more technical terminology this is a transitiC from
patitardbalism (or gerontocracy) to sultanism: "The most primitive
types of traditional authority are the cases where a personal adminam
trative staff of the chief is absent . These are 'geroatocraoy* and
'patriarbalium.' The term 'gerontooracy' is applied to a situation where
so far as imperative control is exercised in the group at all it is in
the hands of 'elders.' . . . 'Patriarchalisan' is the situation,. within
a group, which is usually organised on both an economic and kinship basis,
as a household, authority is exercised by a particular individual who is
designated by a definite rule of inheritance. The decisive character of
both is the coeeoption which is held by those subject to authority of
either type that this authority, thoUgh its exercise is a private pre-
rogative of the person or persons involved, is in fact pre-eminently an
authority on behalf of the group as a whole. It must, therefore, be
exercised in the interests of the meesers and is thus not freely appropri-
ated by the incubment. In order that this shall be maintained, it is
crucial that in both these cases there is a coWlete absence of a= adminis-
trative staff over which the individual in authority has personal coatrol.
Be is, hence, still to a large extent dependent on the willingness of the
group meeters to respect his authority since he has no machinery to enforce
it . Those subject to authority are hence still meiers of the group and
not 'subjects. But their meebyership exists by tradition and not by
virtue of legislation or a deliberate act of adherems. Goedience is
owed to the person of the chief, not to any established rule. But it
is owed to the chief only by virtue of his traditional status MW is
thus on his part strictly bound by tradition." But the development of
an administrative staff by means of which the chief can enforce his
personal will marks a crucial point of political transition: "gith the
development of a purely personal administrativ e , especially a mili
tary force under the control of the chief, traditional authority tends
to develop into patrinonialism.' Where absolute authority is maximised,
it may be called 'sultanisa.' The 'moemers' are now treated as 'subjects.'
An authority of the chief which was previously treated principally as
exercised an behalf of the meebers, now becomes his personal authority,
which he appropriates in the same way as he would any ordinary object of
possessica. Re is also eatitled to exploit it, in principle, like any
economic advantage-to sell it, to pledge it as security, or to divide
it by inheritance The primary external support of pairian ni authority
is a staff of slaves, coloni or conscripted subjects, or, in order to
enlist meters* self-interest in opposition to the subjects as far as
possible, Of merocmary bodyguards and armies. By the use of these instru-
ments of force the chief tends to broaden the range of his arbitrary power
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which is free of traditional restrictions and to put himself in a position
to grant grace and favors at the expense of the traditional limitations
typical of patriarchal and gerontocratic structure. Where authority is
primrily oriented to tradition but in its exercise nakes the claim of
full personal powers, it will be called *patrimonial* authority. Where
patrianial authority lays primary stress on the sphere of arbitrary will
free of traditional limitations, it will be called 'sultanism.' The
transition is definitely continuous. Both are distinguished from priary
patriarchalism by the presence of a personal administrative staff. Same-
times even sultanism appears superficially to be completely bound by
tradition, but this is never in fact the case. The non-traditional
element is not, however, rationalised in impersonal terms, but consists
in an extreme development of the sphere of arbitrary will and grace."
The Theor of Social and Econoic Organization, New York, 1947, pp. 346-
347.
44. See Wales, H. 0., Ancient Southeast Asian Warfare, London, 1952.
45 Negara, literally, means "capital city," "palace," "stath" or "country,
thus reflecting the notion of the city as a kind of spring-like source of
supra-village (and so, in part, alien) political authority. (See Juynboll,
H. U., Oudjavaansch-Nederlandsche Woordenlijst, Leiden, 1923, p. 310;
Pigeaud, Th., Javaans-Nederlands Bandwoordenbook, Groningen and Batavia,
a d., p. 309.) As control over the "negara" central government shifted
hands, the name applied to it tended to shift accordingly, reflecting
changing political realities (though the court-cities continued to be
called e k in the time of the East Indian Company; guperme.
after the rise of the Dutch East Indies dual civil service, and peunrintah
(a Malay word) for the present Republican government. Pusat, a more
colloquial (Malay) word coamonly used to refer to the Government means,
literally , "center."
46. The comon view of Dutch scholars in that the sedentary, ringed-in
village is indigenous in Java, but my view follows that of-Furnivall:
"In Indonesian i .e ., pre-colonial] times settlemts most usually have
been small, far-scattered and impermanent. Doubtless each settlement was
Jealous of encroachets over such land within its sphere of influence as
it required for cultivation, grazing or fuel, but a very small area would
suffice its needs even for shifting cultivation. . . . There must have
been large areas wholly unappropriated and open to new settlements.
At any time an epidemic or sone other unfavorable portent, would induce
a settlement to move its quarters; there was an abundance of waste where
it could settle and there were no surveyors to delimit boundaries. Similar
conditions obtained long after the arrival of the Hindus, and, when the
Hindus gradually asserted rights of sovereignty, they were more concerned
to increase the number of their dependants and followers than to draw rent
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from the land. . . . Not until Dutch rule began to stabilise conditions,
can there have been any steady tendemoy for land to acquire a value apart
from the man who cultivated it . As land became valnable and population
grew, settlements would beeam e a merans ad aMg, ld the ihabi tants
would tend to be more Jealous of emrOachMant, 90 that the tewritoral
village would came into exist.ence. . . . The p&eems g f st"4ier
inda er indu-Javanese vule, but was not gemeral Untii a bW 9C
of the Dutch, when for the first time the village as a territeial it
beam' a moral organism with its aaW gover at ad its u ad at
disposal of its Inhabitants.'" Netherlandas India, op. *it., pp. 12-23.
Except for the fact that the village mast have ben a noral orgasdsuW
even when it was not sedentary and that it nw seems doubtful that RiXW~u
immigrants ever simply asserted rights of sovereignty" over Indonesias
(see below), this view seem accurate; and Purnivall 'a emassis
on pax nederiandica as playing an important role in stimulating populatico
points up another 'important factor involved in Western contact.
47. The terms for such core villagers differ over the island: huh,
kull ketjeng, gool, etc. For a general review of village land tenure
systems in Java, see.Ter iar, cit.
48. The rotation systen still persists, however, in many Javanese villages
today. -
49. Partial exceptions to this generalization are found in the eastern
and western ends of Java. The involuted sawah-daminated type of agri-
culture here being empbasised finds its climx in the center of the islead,
and the further one moves toward either the eastern or western tips the
more it tends to thin out, leaving somewhat more room for consolidation
of landholdings. In general, the landscape types of Java are three (see
Dobby, op. opt. pp. 216ff.): (1) a generally limestone dominated southern
coast which, in addition to having almost no good protected harbors, is
rather arid and infertile; (2) a series of young, active, and basic vol-
canoes which in the west break off into a generally' hilly and uneven
countryside but in the center and east of the island rise straight up out
of the great alluvial plains which compose the great rice bowls of Java--
Solo, Iadiun, Kediri, and balang; (3) a northern coast composed either
of relatively swampy alluvial terraces or, in the east, of limestone plat-
forms, and marked with several easily navigable ports. Climatologically,
the island becoms drier as one moves east; beyond the Mediun plain a quite
pronounced dry season, in the time of the Southeast monsoon (April to
September), appears, but in the west the climate is more evenly tropical
with heavy rain in all months. Land use patterns are, naturally, related
to this distribution of landscape types. Plantation agriculture is strong
in the colder west (tea, pepper, tobacco, quinine) and the drier east
(sugar, coffee), where capital requirements for productive cultivation
tend to be higher than they are in the easily irrigated, volcano-fertilised
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center (roughly the region between Purwokerto and Kediri). The peasant
eoowes in the West is heavily dominated by rice, often almost to the
point of acoculture, the east increasingly by maize, while in the center
one finds a highly diversified agriculture with a nie balance between wet
and dry season crops. Highlands in all regions are marked by truch-
gardening for Western-type vegetables--cabbage, squash, even potatoes.
In the chalky, infertile south much of the cultivated land is still in
root crops, particularly in that Javanese symbol for cheerless poverty,
Oassava, the "wooden root." In the east, there is a marked emphasis cn
livestock raising; in the west, slash-and-burn persists in a, few isolated
areas. But, despite this diversity, it is still the highly intensified
and marvellcusly diversified agriculture of the center rice bans which
is both the type-model and the dominating elemnt in JayanMe agriculture;
the ideal pattern toward which the other forms of agriculture are oriented
and in terms of which they are oneeived
50. It is possible, of course, for absolute unite returns to both to have
dropped, and this seems to be what has happened, with labor returns falling
only slightly faster than land returns. Imagine an acre of irrigated land
which in the barangay period yields an output of 100 while absorbing the
labor of four mia. Assuming no return to land, which is a free good, and
ignoring costs, each worker will get a return of 25. Next, suppose the
sam land worked somsehat more intensively with five ma, for. an output
of 120 and, as land has come to be a little tighter, assume the owner of
the land, who most likely will be one of the workers as well, get one-
half of a laborer 's share as his return. Each worker will then get an
output of about 22, the landowner will get about 11. If there is further
intensification, the proportions will change in the same fashion. Asanme
the same land, one labor share to the owner of the more valuable land,
nine workers and an output of 180. Each worker will get 18; so will the
landhoIder. Finally, in the more modern case, an output of 200, 17 workers
and one and one-half shares to the landholder, gives about 1; to the land-
holder, 11 to the worker. Here, the shares of both are falling.
51. But, as already emphasized, the plantations, because of their close
interlocking **th the seasonal and structural demands of the subsistence
econom, their tendency to minimise, so far as possible, the revolutionary
implications of their own form of economic organization for Javanese
patterns of adaptation, tended neither to create nor absorb such a wholly
proletarianized class; to tear them out of their social context to the
degree larger comercial concerns seen to have done elsewhere.
52. For a description of the evolution and administrative organization
of Uataram see Rauffeer, op. cit., upon whom the following sumazy is
largely based.
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53. There were areas outside his control altogether; I .e., other kingdoms,
and no doubt areas of overlap and conflict with those kingdom. Mstly
they were seaport kingdoms, from Banta in the west to Surabaja in the
east, but in time the Dutch reduced the western ones, rntaram the eastors
ones, so that by the time of the Company Utaram and the Company itself
were the only two sovereign "kingdom" left . On the political history of
the struggle between itaram and other kingdoms of this period, see
Schrieke, B., o.t ., pp ,80ff.
54. For a discussion of the political function of the king 's harem in a
state very mch similar to this, see Leach, op. cit.: "The size of the
palace and the number of the prince 's wives was (and is) more or less
proportion to the political influence of the [Shan or Burmese] prince
p. 216.
55. For a review of the changing status of the "native rulers" in the
Colonial Period, see Schrieke, op. cit., pp. 169ff.
56. "Both [Java and the outer islands] were divided into [Residencies];
22 in Java and 17 in the Outer Possessions. . . . In Java two Residencies
Solo (i.e., Surakarta] and Jogya, were composed of Native States, and the
rest were wholly Government Lands. In the Government lands each Residene
comrised a certain number of divisions under European Assistant Residents,
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nevertheless tends to oppose the over-estimation of the scale .f the earliest JavanV
kingdoms, which the traditional historians attributed to hindu creativity,
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acted to legitimize the political aspirations of an emerging political
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105i Not, of course, that the kings and princes had no navies, but rather
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pursuit of trade free of political interference by another, eto,, and in
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in the way of the new Arab countries is the necessity to overcome rapidly
the traditional Islamic concept of, and attitude tward, the state as such.
Islam never developed the idea of 'the State as an independent political
institution,' which has been so characteristic of classical and Western
thought. 'In Islam the State was not a comammity or an institution, but
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115. The fact that Islam came to Indonesia largely from India meant that
the Eystical elements in it were already rather stronger and that it was
more hinduistic than the mddle-la~stern version, making the conversion of
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132. "It is only in the modern Western World [Weber was writing before
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